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Report and Recommendation of the Louisiana State
Law Institute to the House Civil Law and Procedure
Committee of the Louisiana Legislature Relative to the
Reinstatement of Fault as a Prerequisite to a Divorce
Kenneth Rigby*
I. THE TASK
In 1998, the Louisiana Legislature urged and requested the
Louisiana State Law Institute ("Law Institute") to study and make
recommendations to the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee as
to the merits of reinstating fault as a prerequisite to a divorce in
Louisiana.'
II. PURPOSE OF PROPOSAL
The first step in recommending whether fault should be reinstated
as a prerequisite to a divorce is to define the purpose of the proposal.
Several purposes suggest themselves:
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Attorney at Law, Shreveport, Louisiana; Adjunct Professor, Paul M. Hebert
Law Center; Member of Persons Committee and Council, Louisiana State Law
Institute.
1. See H.R., Reg. Sess., No. 1 (La. 1998) (attached to this Report as Appendix
A). Pursuant to this Resolution, the President of the Louisiana State law Institute,
Robert L. Curry, III, appointed the following members of a Divorce Committee:
Kenneth Rigby, Shreveport, Louisiana, Chairperson; Paul M. Hebert, Jr., Baton
Rouge, Louisiana; Jean Morgan Meaux, Metairie, Louisiana; J. N. Prather, Jr.,
Lafayette, Louisiana; Mary C. Devereux, Covington, Louisiana; Karen D. Downs,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Phillip R. Riegel, Jr., New Orleans, Louisiana; Walter M.
Sanchez, Lake Charles, Louisiana. All members of the Divorce Committee are
actively engaged in the practice of Family Law, all are certified as Family Law
Specialists by the Board of Legal Specialization of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, and all are members of the Family Law Section of the Louisiana State
Bar Association. Cumulatively, they represent 180 years of the practice of law in
Louisiana.
The Committee met for several all-day conferences, reviewed numerous
law review articles and other commentaries of legal, social science, and other
experts, examined the available statistical data, extensively shared the members'
empirical opinions, and made the recommendation contained in this Report to the
Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable suggestions and input of
the members of the Divorce Committee.
The original report of the Law Institute to the House Civil Law and
Procedure Committee of the Louisiana Legislature has, in some instances, been
reformatted in order to conform to the Louisiana Law Review requirements.
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1. To discourage hasty or ill-thought-out marriages;
2. To preserve the quality of marriage;
3. To preserve the longevity of marriage;
4. To preserve marriage as a socially desirable societal
institution;
5. To provide an occasion for catharsis or an emotional
therapeutic opportunity in the divorcing process;
6. To provide an opportunity for a wronged spouse to
formally and publicly document the nature and extent of
the claimed wrong by the other spouse, and to obtain ajudicial confirmation of it;
7. To provide a mechanism for the formal judging of the acts
of the spouses during marriage, with the resulting punitive
and vindication consequences;
8. To discourage divorce by making the process of obtaining
a divorce more difficult, more unpleasant, more
expensive, and more revealing of a person's foibles,
weaknesses and other shortcomings.
Although this Report discusses other possible purposes, the Law
Institute assumes that the purposes of divorce reform should be (1) to
discourage hasty or ill-thought-out marriage, (2) to preserve the
quality of marriage, (3) to preserve the longevity of marriage, and (4)
to preserve marriage as a socially desirable societal institution.
III. STATISTICAL DATA-IS MARRIAGE IN LOUISIANA IN TROUBLE?
The answer to this question is subjective, but the statistical data
concerning divorce supplies an objective view of what has happened
to marriage both nationally and in Louisiana.
The following national and Louisiana data and long term trends
were reported by a social scientist in January, 1982:2
A. The Divorce Rate
Divorce was a rare phenomenon during the Colonial
period. In fact, until the turn of the Civil War, divorce was
not considered important enough to warrant statistical
recording. In the mid-1800s, however, due to attempts to
establish equal rights for women, divorce laws were liberalized
2. Charles E. Vetter, Child Custody: A New Direction (1982) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Dr. Vetter is a professor of Sociology, Centenary
College, in Shreveport, Louisiana. See Kenneth Rigby, Alternate Dispute




and "by the 1860s various groups, fearful that family values
were being undermined, demanded that national divorce
figures be tabulated." Divorce statistics first begun to be
collected in 1867. In that year, the total number of divorces
was 9,937 or about 0.3 divorces per 1,000 population. One
hundred years later in 1967, the number increased to over one-
half million, or about 4.2 divorces per 1,000 population. At the
present time (1982), the divorce rate is approximately 5.4
divorces per 1,000 population.
For the sixty years following 1867, the divorce rate
increased consistently-rising about 75 per cent every twenty
years. Had this pattern continued, the divorce rate in 1947
would have been 2.8. However, a steep rise occurred in the
1940s. The United States was at war and in the midst of a
number of upheavals and uncertainties. There was a sharp
increase in the number of marriages-particularly "quickie
marriages." As the war came to an end, many of these
marriages also ended. Thus, in 1946, the divorce rate rose to an
all-time high of 4.3 divorces per 1,000 population. Almost as
suddenly, the rate dropped and leveled off during the 1950s,
remaining at about 2.1 to 2.3 until 1963. In that year the rate
began to climb and within ten years it had almost doubled,
exceeding the 1946 figure. In 1973 the rate was 4.4 and by
1975 it had reached 4.9. In 1976 and 1977 the rate remained
the same at 5.0. As Scanzoni states "this was the first time in
a decade that the rate had not climbed from one year to the
next, and it may signal a slowdown of the spectacular rate
increases that had been taking place previously." Many
demographers and authorities on marriage and divorce state
that, during the next decade or two, "the odds seem to favor
some continuation of the current slow rise in the divorce rate,
with the trend broken periodically by a year or more of stability
or decline."
The crude divorce rate (number of divorces per 1,000
population) is not the most accurate way to determine the
divorce picture. A more meaningful rate of divorce is the
refined divorce rate (number of divorces per 1,000 married
women). The refined divorce rate looks at the percentage of
all existing marriages that break up in any one year. Thus in
1978, for example, there were over 1.1 million divorces among
a total of 51.1 million married women or a rate of almost 22
divorces for every 1,000 marriages in existence that year.
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The divorce rate in 1920 was 8 per 1,000 wives, and by the
early 1940s it had risen to about 10 per 1,000 wives. During
the 1950s it fell to under 10. Since the early 1960s the rate
started rising and by the late 1960s, the rise began to increase
sharply. From 1965 to 1975 the rate doubled and has continued
to rise to the present. It is estimated that the 1982 rate will be
22 per 1,000 married women. Once again, as with the crude
divorce rate, it appears to many authorities that the refined
divorce rate will also level off during the next decade or two.
Based on this brief presentation, the following conclusions
can be drawn concerning divorce in the United States:
(1) The divorce rate has steadily increased within the past
fifteen years.
(2) More people are divorcing today than ever before.
(3) The divorce rate appears to be leveling off.
(4) It is estimated that roughly four out of every ten marriages
made in recent years will end in divorce.
(5) The divorce rate is higher today than ever in the history of
the United States.
(6) There are no indications that the divorce rate will drop to
the 1950s level in the near future.
Although it is difficult due to incomplete data, a similar
picture of divorce can be drawn for the State of Louisiana.
Indeed, the trend in the divorce rate parallels rather closely the
national trend.
The divorce rate reached a high mark around 1947, then
declined and leveled off during the 1950s and early 1960s.
Starting around 1965 the rate began to increase and has
continued to do so to the present. It appears to have leveled off
at about 3.3 or 3.4 per 1,000 population. Although the state
divorce rate is below the national level, basically the same
conclusions can be drawn:
(1) The divorce rate has steadily increased within the past 15
years.
(2) More people are divorcing today than ever before. For
example, there was a 12% increase in the number of
divorces and annulments in Louisiana from 1975 to 1976.
(3) The divorce rate appears to be leveling off.
(4) It is estimated that there is approximately one divorce
granted for every three marriages.




(6) There are no indications that the divorce rate will drop
to the 1950s level in the near future.3
More recent data, for the period 1980-1990, reveal the following
statistics on divorce.' The number of divorcing couples in the
United States was 1,182,000 in 1990, the highest number since 1985
(1,190,000) but three percent lower than the peak number in 1981
(1,213,000). The divorce rate per 1,000 population for 1990 was
4.7, the same as in 1989, but eleven percent lower than the peak rate
of 5.3 in 1979 and in 1981. Provisional data indicate that the rate
remained steady at 4.7 in 1991, but increased slightly to 4.8 in 1992
before dropping to 4.6 in 1993.
Attached to this Report is a table that lists the number of
divorces and annulments in the United States for each of the years
1940 through 1990 and shows the crude and refined rate per
thousand for each of those years.5
Compared to 1980, the number of divorces in 1990 was lower
in every region of the United States except the South.6 The number
declined three percent in the Northeast, six percent in the Midwest,
and two percent in the West. Divorces in the South were five
percent higher than in 1980.'
3. Id. at 9-15 (footnotes omitted).
4. Center for Business & Economic Research, University of Louisiana at
Monroe, Number and Rate of Marriages and Divorces, United States and Louisiana,
1960-1995 (1997) [hereinafter Center for Business & Economic Research]
(attached to this Report as Exhibit 1). See also National Center for Health
Statistics, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, Monthly Statistics
Report, Vol. 43, No. 9, at 1 & Table 1 (Supp. Mar. 22, 1995) (Divorces and
annulments and rates: United States, 1940-90) (Table 1 attached to this Report as
Exhibit 2) [hereinafter NCHS Report No. 9].
5. NCHS Report No. 9, supra note 4, at Table 1. See Vetter, supra note 2, at
3 (distinguishing between the crude divorce rate and the refined divorce rate and
concluding that the refined divorce rate is a more meaningful rate of divorce). With
respect to the Louisiana data contained in the Tables published by the NCHS, it
should be noted that Louisiana is not one of the states that consistently reports the
number of divorces to the National Center for Health Studies (NCHS). See
Katherine S. Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal
Implications, 59 La. L. Rev. 63, 110 n.307 (1998). See also National Center for
Health Statistics, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Monthly
Statistics Report, Vol. 43, No. 13, at 37 (Oct. 23, 1995) (Technical Notes): "Indiana
and Louisiana do not report divorces on a provisional basis." The NCHS uses
sampling and other statistical methods to estimate the number of divorces in states
when the data from a state are incomplete, either because the state is not one of the
reporting states or the data from a reporting state are incomplete. In these instances,
the divorce rate is not computed. See NCHS Report No. 9, supra note 4, at Table
2 n.2 (attached to this Report as Exhibit 3).
6. NCHS Report No. 9, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Id. See id. at Table 2.
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A concern is the impact of divorce on children. In 1980, the rate
of children under 18 years of age involved in divorces was 17.3 per
1,000 children. In 1990, the rate was 16.8.' Attached to this Report
is a table that shows by percentage the number of children involved
in divorce under the age of 18 years of age in each participating state
in the years 1989 and 1990."
Divorce is more frequent for men and women under the age of 40
than for older married couples.' In 1990, the divorce rate for men
increased from 32.8 per 1,000 married men 15-19 years of age to 50.2
per 1,000 for men 20-24 years and declined with increasing age to 2.1
for married men 65 years of age and older." A similar pattern exists
for women.
Almost two-thirds of divorcing men and three-fourths of
divorcing women were under 40 years of age. 2 The modal group for
men was 30-34 years of age (20.7 percent)" and the modal group for
women was 25-29 years of age (21.8 percent). ' Since the mid- 1970s
the age at divorce of men and women has shifted upward. 5 The
median age at divorce for men and women was more than three years
older in 1990 than in 1975.16 One factor that may affect the shifting
of the age at decree is that the age of marriage has also shifted
upward. The median age at marriage for both divorcing husbands
and wives was approximately two years older in 1990 than in the
1970s.'8
Most divorces occur within the first ten years of marriage. 9 The
median duration of marriage for all divorcing couples in 1989 and
1990 was 7.2 years, which is the longest duration in the 1970-1990
8. Id. at 2-3. See id. at Table 3 (attached to this Report as Exhibit 4). Note
that the statistics in Table 3 are based on sample data.
9. Id. at 2-3. See id. at Table 4 (attached to this Report as Exhibit 5). Note
that the statistics in Table 4 are based on sample data.
10. Id. at 3. See id. at Tables 5-8 (attached to this Report as Exhibits 6 through
9).
11. Id. at 3. See id. at Table 5 (attached to this Report as Exhibit 6).
12. Id. at 3. See id. at Table 6 (attached to this Report as Exhibit 7).
13. Id. at 3. See id. at Table 6.
14. Id. at 3. See id. at Table 6.
15. Id. at 3. See id. at Table 7 (attached to this Report as Exhibit 8).
16. Id. at 3. See id. at Table 7.
17. Id. at 4. See id. at Table 9 (attached to this Report as Exhibit 10). The
mean and the median are measures of central tendency. The mean is computed by
summing the values of the item under consideration and dividing this sum by the
number of observations included. The median is the middle value of a set of
observations that have been arranged in order of magnitude. There are an equal
number of observations above and below the median. Id. at 31 (Technical Notes).
18. Id. at4. Seeid. atTable9.
19. Id. at 4. See id. at Table 10 (attached to this Report as Exhibit 11).
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period.2" In 1970, it was 6.7 years; and in 1980, it was 6.8 years.2'
For first marriages, the median duration of the marriage in 1990 was
8.1 years for men and women.22 For second or more marriages, the
median duration of the marriage decreased with the number of
marriages, reflecting a historical trend since 1970.23
In Louisiana, the number of divorces in 1980 was 18,108, or a
divorce rate of 4.3 per 1,000 population.24 In 1990, the numbers were
12,523 and 3.0, respectively. 5 In 1995, the numbers were 15,097 and
3.5, respectively. The accompanying charts reveal a precipitous
increase in Louisiana in both the number of divorces and the divorce
rate per 1,000 population commencing in 1976, with a slight gradual
increase in both numbers through 1995.26
IV. PERSPECTIVE
No-fault divorce and fault-based divorce are not new or unique.
They are both at least 2,500 years old. A review of the history of
divorce in ancient civilizations such as Egypt, Rome, and Greece, its
development in countries such as Germany and England, the
influence of the Church, and the other factors that influence divorce
place fault-based and no-fault divorce into historical perspective and
suggest some reasons why fault was originally introduced into the
divorcing process.
A. History of Divorce and Separation
As long as men and women have entered into variant forms of
cohabiting relationships generally called marriage, various societies
have regulated the relationship and its termination, as well as the
societal consequences of its termination to the participants, to the
children produced by the relationship, and to the property acquired by
the parties.
20. Id. at 4. See id. at Table 10
21. Id. at 4. See id. at Table 10.
22. Id. at 4. See id. at Table 10.
23. Id. at 4. See id. at Table 10.
24. Center for Business & Economic Research, supra note 4, at 1 (attached to
this Report as Exhibit 1).
25. Id.
26. There are two apparently unexplained exceptions to this conclusion. In
1972, there was a one-year surge in the numbers, to 10,618 divorces and a rate of
2.8. In 1987 and 1988, the numbers significantly dropped for each of these two
years, increased again in 1989, and have gradually increased through 1995. Id.
KENNETH RIGB Y 5672002]
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1. Egypt 7
In early Egypt, when a marriage broke down, divorce was
possible and could be initiated by either the wife or the husband.
Like marriage and adultery, divorce was a private matter in which the
state took no interest and it seems that at no time was it considered to
be socially unacceptable. For the husband, the actual divorce was
simple. He merely had to recite the following formula before
witnesses:
I have dismissed you as wife, I have abandoned you, I have no
claim on earth upon you. I have said to you, 'Take a husband
for yourself in any place to which you may go.'
The most common reasons for a husband to "dismiss" his wife
were her inability to bear children or, more especially, to provide him
with a son; his wish to marry someone else; or the fact that she simply
ceased to please him. A wife might divorce her husband, but only for
"cause," cruelty to her, either physical or, in modem parlance, mental.
If a man divorced his wife, he had to return her dowry and give
her the "marriage portion" that had been agreed in their marriage
settlement. He also had to pay her compensation and give her a share
(usually a third, but sometimes a half) of any property that they had
acquired during their marriage. If, however, the divorce originated
with the wife, then she forfeited her right to a share of the communal
property, and she had to pay compensation to her husband. Once
divorced, both men and women could remarry as soon as they wished.
2. Rome28
From the dawn of the Roman legend to the Punic Wars in 202
B.C., the usual Roman family was patriarchal, and the intra-family
relationships were stable, simple, and rigid. Although the laws of the
Twelve Tables, promulgated in 450 B.C., expressly recognized the
right of the husband to divorce his wife, divorce was rare. 9 The
grounds for and frequency of divorce in the Roman Republic during
this period is described as follows:
The law of Romulus permitted divorce to men but refused it
to women. It was permitted on the grounds of adultery,
27. Barbara Watterson, Women in Ancient Egypt 70-72 (1991).
28. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion of divorce in Rome isTound in
Joyce Green et al., Dissolution of Marriage 8 (1986) [hereinafter Dissolution of
Marriage].
29. Id. See also Lawrence A. Moloney, Comment, Our Divorce Laws, 9 Loy.
L. Rev. 238, 240 (1923).
[Vol. 62
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poisoning of children and falsification or counterfeiting of
keys. While the law granted divorce, the moral feeling of the
people and their respect for the marriage bond, coupled with
some fear of public opinion, was such that no divorces are of
record in Rome for the first 520 years of its existence.
30
During the period between the Punic Wars and the fourth century
anno domini, many changes occurred in Roman society. There was
an absence of men for long periods of time because of service in the
Roman legions in foreign countries during the period of Roman
expansion and conquest. Women emerged as a wealthy independent
class, due in part to the absence of the men. The institution of slavery
resulted from the Roman conquests, wealth was enhanced, and the
leisure time of the Roman citizens was increased. Upper class
conspicuous consumption and individualism also increased.
Marriages for limited purposes were common; many were only for
money, social position, or political gain.
As a result of these influences, the stability of the Roman family
was upset. Divorce was popular and marriage was not. Both the
husband and the wife were given the right to divorce at will. Divorce
was described as epidemic.3' Some efforts were made to reduce
30. Moloney, supra note 29, at 240.
31. See Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 9 (quoting E. Westermarck,
The History of Human Marriage 320-21, 323 (5th ed. 1925)):
Almost all the well-known ladies of the Circeronian age were divorced at
least once. Seneca said that some women counted their years, not by
consul, but by their husbands. Ovid and Pliny the Younger married three
times. Caesar and Antony, four, Sulla and Pompey five; and such cases
must have been frequent. On the stone erected to a certain Turia by her
husband in the early days of the Empire it is said, "seldom do marriages
last until death undivorced."
Moloney identifies the Consul Quintus Vespillio as the husband and the full
inscription to be, "Seldom do marriages last until death un-divorced; but ours
continued happily for forty-one years." Moloney, supra note 29, at 242. Moloney
further reports that during this period, when marriage became merely a civil
contract, divorce became common:
Cicero repudiated his wife Terentia, while Augustus forced the husband
of Lydia to divorce her, that he might have her for himself. One woman
had ten husbands in five years, while St. Jerome states that there was in
Rome a woman who had married her twenty-third husband, she herself
being his twenty-first wife. "Divorce," writes Tertullian, "is the fruit of
marriage"... Ovid and Pliny the Younger had three wives: Caesar and
Anthony four; Sulla and Pompey five. Nero, who was a much wedded
man, was the third husband of Poppea, and the fifth of another ofhis wives
... Seneca, the Roman philosopher, says: "Does any woman now blush
at divorce when some illustrious and noble women compute their own
years not by the number of consuls, but by the number of their husbands,
and divorce themselves for the sake of marriage, and marry for the sake of
divorce."
2002]
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divorce and regulate the consequences ofdivorce. Emperor Augustus
attempted to restrict divorce by enacting the Lex Julia de Adulteris in
18 B.C. This law required a party desiring a divorce to execute a
repudium, a written statement renouncing the marriage, in the
presence of seven Roman citizens. 32 It also made adultery a crime
and required that a husband divorce his adulterous wife.3 Roman law
also required that a husband who divorced his wife for minor cause,
or who was at fault himself, return his wife's dowry, or dos.34 If the
wife divorced the husband, or was at fault, the husband could retain
one-sixth of the dowry for each child of the marriage, up to a
maximum of one-half the dowry. The husband retained the custody
of the children of the marriage.3' These laws had little or no effect on
divorce.36
3. Hebrews 37
From the time of the Biblical Patriarchs to the Roman occupation
of Palestine in 65 B.C., the two primary characteristics of Hebrew
divorce were that (1) a husband had the unilateral right to divorce his
wife for any reason and (2) divorce was a private matter,
unsupervised by the public or by the law. To divorce his wife, a
husband had to give her a bill of divorcement, or a get, which




32. Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 9.
33. See id. (quoting J. Balsdon, Roman Women, Their History and Their Habits
219-21 (1963) who wrote of the chilling effect this had on husbands of rich wives):
For divorce has always had its crude financial aspect; and when a husband
had no better ground of divorcing his wife than the fact he found her
company tedious, he was frequently restrained, no doubt, by the chill
realization that he could not divorce her without replacing her dowry.
Cicero was at his wits' end to find the necessary money when he divorced
Terentia in late 47 or 46 B.C., and it is probable that when he died four
years later, the dowry was still not repaid.
34. Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 9.
35. Id.
36. Moloney, supra note 29, at 244 (stating that the "laws passed by Augustus
had little or no effect"). Jerome Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome 96-97(1940) (stating that the divorce epidemic continued despite Augustus' law, or
perhaps because of it). See also Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 9 n.28.
37. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion of Hebrew divorce is from
Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 6-7. See also Perl v. Perl, 126 A.D.2d
91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Ze'ev Falk, Jewish Matrimonial Law in the Middle Ages
113 (1966).
38. For a discussion of modem Jewish divorce law and the problem of
compelling the husband to give the wife a get, see Ira Ellman et al., Family Law:
[Vol. 62
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Before the Common Era, however, rabbinical schools expressed
disapproval of divorce and attempted to impose a fault system upon
Hebrew divorce customs. The rabbis increased the details and
formalities of divorcement. Fault grounds were enunciated for the
husband, including adultery, flagrant disregard of moral decency,
refusal to cohabit for a year or more, change of religion, and physical
"disease" such as barrenness or leprosy of the wife.39 Influenced by
the Roman law, rabbinical law also recognized divorce grounds for
Hebrew wives. These grounds included physical impotence if
admitted by the husband, change of religion, extreme dissoluteness,
refusal of support, continued mistreatment, commission of a crime
followed by escape from the country, post-marital affliction of a
loathsome disease, and pursuit of a disgusting trade. Adultery of the
husband was not included. Rabbis eventually enforced divorces
against couples with or without their consent if the marriage was in
conflict with rabbinical law, and they also invalidated marriages
which could not fulfill the marital purpose of procreation.
4. Greece4°
Greek divorce mirrored divorce under Hebrew and Roman law.
Only the husband could divorce at will; he could repudiate his wife
before witnesses for any reason or no reason. The wife was
considered an incapable. The only way she could obtain a divorce
was to submit a written claim for a divorce before the archon, who
was the traditional protector of all incapables.
Cases, Text, Problems 200, 208 (Michie 1991) and the numerous sources cited
therein. The authors point out that the "get," the formal document establishing the
wife's right to remarry, is governed by very formal and exact rules pertaining to the
writing, signing and delivery of the get:
The Mishnah mentions a particular form of get which was customary in
the case ofkohanim, who were regarded as pedantic and hot-tempered and
therefore likely to be hasty in divorcing their wives. This form of
get---called a "folded" or "knotted" one as opposed to a "plain"
get--consisted of a series of folds, each of which (called a kesher) was
stitched and required the signature of three witnesses (two in the case of
a "plain" get) who signed on the reverse side and not on the face, between
each fold. All this was done to draw out the writing and signing of the get
so that the husband might reconsider and become reconciled with his wife.
The "folded" get was customary in ancient times only and the rules
pertaining to it are omitted from most of the codes.
Id. at 200. See also Menachem Elon, The Principles of Jewish Law 421 (M. Elon
ed., 1975).
39. Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 6-7; W. Goodsell, A History of
Marriage and the Family 72 (1934).
40. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion of Greek divorce is from
Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 7.
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A Greek husband had the duty to divorce his wife if she were
barren or committed adultery, because these conditions frustrated the
Greek purpose of marriage, the perpetuation of the gens, or clan. On
the other hand, in the Greek city-state of Sparta, which placed great
importance on a strong army, adultery was not considered a sufficient
ground for a divorce.
Both during the marriage and upon divorce, a Greek woman had
very few rights. A divorced woman was entitled to the return of her
dowry, whether she was guilty or innocent. However, she lost
custody of the children and was required to return to her father's
family and legal authority.
5. Athens4l
In Athens, unlike Greece generally, divorce was easily attainable,
either by mutual consent or through action on behalf of either one of
the spouses; there was no stigma attached. When the divorce was
initiated by the husband, he was merely required to send his wife
from his house. When the wife wished a divorce, she needed the
intercession of her father or some other male citizen to bring the case
before the archon. There are only three cases from the Classical
period where an Athenian divorce proceeded from the wife's side.
Since children were produced to perpetuate the father's house,
they were the property of their father, and remained in his house when
marriages were dissolved through death and probably also in cases of
divorce. The divorcee or widow was thus entirely free to remarry and
to bear children of a new husband.
The purpose of marriage was procreation, within the limits of the
economic resources of the family. The necessity that the bride be a
virgin, coupled with the ancient belief that young girls were lustful,
made an early marriage desirable. A girl was ideally married at the
age of fourteen to a man of about thirty. The husband who married
at thirty could well be dead at forty-five, having begotten two or three
children within the marriage and leaving his wife a candidate for
remarriage. A young widow could serve as a wife in a number
of serial marriages. Because marriage was the preferable condition
for women, and men were protective of their women, a dying
husband, like a divorcing husband, might arrange a future marriage
for his wife.
41. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion of divorce in Athens is from





Under Germanic law, a man could repudiate a woman for her
inability to bear children as well as for the commission of any serious
crime. If she were beyond reproach, he still could divorce her if he
was willing to relinquish control over her property and pay her a
compensation equal to that of a bride-gift. A wife had to remain
faithful and obedient to her husband, even if he was a drunkard, a
gambler, mistreated her, or was adulterous. Under the simplistic
Germanic laws, the Burgundian Code, she was to be smothered in
mire if she attempted to divorce him. The Visigothic law permitted
a wife to sue for divorce if her husband was guilty of pederasty or
having forced her to fornicate with another. Fidelity in marriage was
required of the wife only, not of the husband, unless he sinned with
another man's spouse.
7. England43
Augustine summoned up thepurpose of marriage in three words:
procreation, fidelity, sacrament. During the first one thousand years
of the common era, marriage was deemed by the church to be a
sacrament. The dissolution of marriage was thus governed by
canonical law, which considered that marriage was to last for the
duration of the joint lives of the parties.45 The authority to dissolve
marriage was vested in ecclesiastical courts.46
42. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion of divorce in Germany is from
2 A History of Women in the West: Silences of the Middle Ages 176 (Christiane
Klapisch-Zuber ed., 1992) [hereinafter History of Women in the West].
43. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion of divorce in England is from
Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 10-14; William J. O'Donnell & David
A. Jones, The Law of Marriage and Martial Alternatives 115-16 (1982) [hereinafter
O'Donnell & Jones]; Judith Areen, Cases and Materials on Family Law 317 (1992);
Joel P. Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce 36-52 (1881);
Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 6 (1985).
44. History of Women in the West, supra note 42, at 223.
45. In 407 A.D., at the Council of Carthage, the church laid down the strict
doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage. Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28,
at 11. See also Weitzmen, supra note 43, at 6.
46. In England these courts would retain control until 1857, when Parliament
established the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. It had the jurisdiction
and powers of the ecclesiastical courts and possessed the legislature's ability to
grant absolute divorces. Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 14. See also
Bishop, supra note 43, at 49. The Act of Parliament establishing this court dated
August 28, 1857, reflects the gender distinctions of that day, as well as earlier and
later times, discussed infra. It authorized a husband to present a petition praying
that his marriage be dissolved "on the ground that his wife has since the celebration
thereofhas been guilty of adultery." On the other hand, the wife could present such
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In England, there were two kinds of divorces granted by
ecclesiastical courts--one total and the other partial.47 The first was
a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. It was a total divorce because of a
prior-existing impediment to the marriage, such as a prohibited
degree of consanguinity between the parties. In a case of a total
divorce, the marriage was declared null, as having been absolutely
unlawful ab initio.
The second form of divorce was the divorce a mensa et thoro, or
the partial divorce. It was granted when the marriage was just and
lawful ab initio, but for some reason occurring during the marriage,
it became improper or impossible for the parties to live together, for
reasons such as adultery, cruelty, or other gross misconduct by one of
the parties. A divorce a mensa et thoro gave the spouses permission
only to live apart, not to remarry.4"
a petition if her husband had been guilty of "incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with
adultery, or of rape, or of sodomy or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such
cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et thoro,
or of adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or
upwards .... ." Bishop, supra note 43, at 49 n.2.
47. Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 13; O'Donnell & Jones, supra
note 43, at 115-16.
48. There were exceptions, however, to the strict doctrine of the indissolubility
of marriage. Canon law provided for divorce in three narrow instances. The first
was called the Pauline Privilege, because it was first enunciated by the Apostle
Paul. An absolute divorce could be granted if a newly converted person's spouse
refused to be converted or cohabit peacefully with the new convert. The convert
could marry only a believer, however. Code of Canon Law, 1983 Code c. 1143-
1146. Butsee Code of Canon Law, 1983 Code c. 1147 (non-Catholic remarriage).
Canon law also provided that an unconsumnimated marriage bond could be validlydissolved by direct intervention from the Pope. The third case was called the
Petrine Privilege. Notum Est, Dec. 6, 1973, Motu Proprio of Pope. It is a
combination of the first two instances.
Papal dispensations were also available to those wealthy people who either
wanted to remarry after a divorce or to marry within prohibited degrees.
Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 13. Additionally, there were a few
instances of very wealthy people squeezing a rare private bill of divorce out of
Parliament. Between 1800 and 1836 there were, on the average, three of these a
year. Areen, supra note 43, at 317. See Harvey Couch, The Evolution of
Parliamentary Divorce in England, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 513 (1978) (providing an
interesting and extensive discussion of parliamentary divorces, including a number
of such divorces obtained by persons of noble birth).
With these few exceptions, England was a "divorceless society" from the
date of the Norman Conquest in 1066 until 1857. Areen, supra note 43, at 317.
Another inroad on ecclesiastical law was a practice, emerging in 1698, by
which Parliament enacted legislation specifically to authorize the remarriage of
certain divorced persons, who were always nobles, in violation of the divorce a
mensa et thoro, which permitted two spouses to live apart but forbad their
remarriage. Between 1715 and 1775, Parliament enacted about sixty of these bills.
O'Donnell & Jones, supra note 43, at 116.
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English secular courts adopted these distinctions when those
courts assumed jurisdiction over divorce, and divorce became a part
of the English common law. Additionally, the courts determined
whether the parties should be allowed to remarry. Courts could
forbid the guilty party of a. divorce a vinculo matrimoni from
remarriage, restrict remarriage for a specified period of time, disallow
marriage during the life of the innocent party, or prohibit marriage to
a paramour if the divorce was for adultery.
The power of the ecclesiastical courts over divorce ended in the
Reformation. The early Protestants rebelled against canon law.49
Martin Luther reclassified marriage as a civil, not a religious, matter
and rejected the jurisdiction ofthe ecclesiastical courts over divorce.5"
The Reformers rejected the concept of self-divorce, believing that the
intervention of some civil authority was necessary to dissolve a
marriage. Roman law and the Christian Scriptures were the
Reformer's primary influences.
The Christian church established a stricter divorce doctrine as a
result of the Reformation. The grounds for divorce a mensa et thoro
(permanent judicial separation) were reduced to one
ground-adultery.5' However, the wealthy citizens of England turned
to the Parliament for decrees of absolute divorce. In 1857, Parliament
established the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.52 It had
the jurisdiction and powers of the ecclesiastical courts and possessed
the legislature's ability to grant absolute divorces. The fault-oriented
system remained intact."
8. United States
The history of divorce in the United States has been succinctly
summarized:
... the notion of fault was taken to the American colonies
where, as one commentator has noted, "when post-revolution
America drafted its divorce legislation, the fault concept was
compulsively carried over into our own legal system where it
remained to this day." Each state developed its own body of
law which, among other things, enumerated grounds for
divorce.
The traditional fault divorce grounds stemmed from the
Biblical ground of adultery. These grounds included cruelty,
49. Dissolution of Marriage, supra note 28, at 13.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id.
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desertion, impotence, imprisonment, intoxication, nonsupport,
and insanity. At one time, adultery was a ground for absolute
divorce in all states.
In the United States, for many years, public policy
supported the statutory fault divorce system. The state had an
interest in protecting and preserving the integrity and stability
of marriage. Therefore, the state not only prohibited divorce
by mutual agreement of the parties, but required that divorces
be granted for just causes, or on fault grounds. The party who
desired a divorce was required to go to court and prove that
the other spouse was guilty of specific marital misconduct
which was a statutorily enunciated ground.
Although used much less frequently, the fault system still
exists in most states.54
V. NATIONAL HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Commencing in 1969, state legislatures began to abrogate fault-
based grounds as the sole causes for divorce." They substituted
54. Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. See Kenneth Rigby & Katherine S. Spaht, Louisiana's New Divorce
Legislation: Background and Commentary, 54 La. L. Rev. 19, 22 n.8 (1993)(quoting from the report of the Louisiana State Law Institute Persons Committee
meeting on May 4, 1984):
The history of divorce law reform in the United States over the past twenty
years reveals a continual increase in realism on the part of lawmakers andjudges. At the beginning of that period the majority of states still
permitted divorce only on traditional fault grounds. (A substantial
minority, Louisiana among them, would grant a divorce after some period
of living separate and apart). That (fault) approach had had its origin in
ecclesiastical law, both in Louisiana and in her sister states, and was
apparently ultimately grounded in the notion that, because ecclesiastical
doctrine gave marriage a religious dimension, marriage should only be
dissolved for a religiously significant reasons-i.e., a sin of one party
against the other.
During the 1970s state legislatures apparently came to accept the
assertions of legal scholars that the fault approach did not accurately
reflect what occurred in most marriage breakdowns, and that it deterred
reconciliation by forcing spouses to adopt adversary attitudes toward each
other. Beginning with California in 1970, an increasing number of states
enacted new, no-fault divorce laws that made dissolution of marriage
available on such easily proven grounds as "irreconcilable differences,"
"incompatibility." Today (in 1984) thirty-nine of the fifty states have such
laws (usually alongside statutes embodying the more traditional fault
grounds). Only one state, South Dakota, still permits divorce exclusively
on fault grounds.
Author's Note: South Dakota now permits a divorce on the grounds of
"irreconcilable differences," as well as specified-traditional fault grounds. See infra
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statutory non-fault causes described as "irreconcilable differences,"
"incompatibility," "irretrievable breakdown of the marriage,"
"incompatibility of temperament," "voluntary separation for
statutorily-mandated periods of time, .... breakdown of the marriage to
the extent that the legitimate objects of marriage have been destroyed
and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
preserved," "a finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken," "a
statutorily mandated period of separation with no reasonable prospect
of reconciliation," and similarly worded no fault causes for divorce.56
Other states have retained fault causes while permitting divorce for
no-fault causes." All fifty states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands
presently permit the obtaining of a divorce without proof of fault."
VI. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF FAULT AS A CAUSE FOR DIVORCE IN
LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 provided that the bond of
matrimony was dissolved by the death of the husband or wife and
whenever the marriage was declared null and void for cause, or when
another marriage was contracted, on account of absence, when
authorized by law.59 Divorce was not given as a cause for the
dissolution of the marriage.60 It also provided that separation from
bed and board did not dissolve the bond of matrimony because the
separated husband and wife were not at liberty to marry again; but it
ended their conjugal cohabitation and to the common concerns that
existed between them.6' The Louisiana Civil Codes of 180862 and
note 56.
56. State Divorce Laws, Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) §§ 442:001-453.001 (1999);
Linda D. Elrod et al., A Review of the Year in Family Law: Children's Issues
Dominate, 32 Fam. L.Q. 661, 715 (1999) (Chart 4: Grounds for Divorce and
Residency Requirements) (attached to this Report as Exhibit 12).
57. Elrod, supra note 56, at 715.
58. Id.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 30 (1808) provided:
The bond of matrimony is dissolved,
1 stly, By the death of the husband or wife;
2dly, Whenever the marriage is declared null and void for one of
the causes mentioned in the third chapter of this title, or when another
marriage is contracted on account of absence, when authorised by law.
Separation from bed and board does not dissolve the bond of
matrimony, since the separated husband and wife are not at liberty to
marry again, but it puts an end to their conjugal cohabitation and to the
common concerns which may subsist between them.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. La. Civ. Code art. 1 (1808) ("Separation from bed and board as it formerly
existed according to the laws of the country, shall take place for the following
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182563 both provided that married persons could reciprocally claim a
separation on account of excesses, cruel treatment or outrages of one
of them towards the other, if it were of such a nature as to render theirliving together insupportable, and for abandonment, publicdefamation, or an attempt by one against the life of the other. They
provided that the husband could claim a separation in case of adultery
on the part of the wife. This relief was not reciprocated to the wife;
she could claim a separation in case of adultery on the part of thehusband only when he had kept his concubine in their common
dwelling.' Neither code provided for divorce.65 Divorce was notpermitted until 1827, when it was provided that married persons
could also claim reciprocally a divorce for the causes enumerated inCivil Code article 138.66 Unless a spouse had been sentenced to aninfamous punishment or convicted of adultery, no divorce could begranted unless ajudgment of separation from bed and board had been
rendered and two years had thereafter elapsed with no reconciliation
between the parties.67 In the two excepted cases, a judgment of
causes"); La. Civ. Code art. 2 ("The husband may claim a separation in case of
adultery on the part of his wife"); La. Civ. Code art. 3 ("The wife may also claim
a separation in case of adultery on the part of her husband, when he has kept his
concubine in their common dwelling."); La. Civ. Code art. 4 ("The married persons
may reciprocally claim a separation, on account of excesses, cruel treatment or
outrages of one of them towards the other, if such ill treatment is of such a natureto render their living together insupportable."). La. Civ. Code art. 5 (1808):Separation may also be reciprocally claimed in the following cases, to wit:1 stly, Of a public defamation on the part of one of the married
persons towards the other.2dly, Of abandonment of the husband by his wife and of the wife
of her husband.
3rdly, Of an attempt of one of the married persons against the life
of the other.63. La. Civ. Code of 1825 repeated, with a few punctuation and stylistic
changes, these provisions of the La. Civ. Code of 1808 in articles 135 through 139.64. La. Civ. Code arts. 2, 3 (1808); La. Civ. Code arts. 136, 137 (1825).65. Neither did the Spanish law nor the marriage legislation of 1807. KatherineS. Spaht, Family Law in Louisiana § 7.2 (4th ed. 1998). By contrast, the CodeNapoleon (1804) in articles 229 and 230 permitted divorce for adultery (with the
same disparate gender treatment as in La. Civ. Code of 1808, arts. 2 and 3 and inLa. Civ. Code of 1825, arts. 136 and 137), as well as for excesses, cruel treatment,
or outrages of one towards the other (art. 231) and condemnation to an infamous
punishment (art. 232).
66. 1827 La. Acts, p. 130, § 4.67. 1827 La. Acts, p. 130, § 4 provided that married persons may also claim
reciprocally a divorce for the several causes enumerated in article 138,
except in the cases where the husband or wife may have been sentenced
to any infamous punishment or convicted ofadultery as provided for in thefirst section of the act, no divorce shall be granted, unless a judgment of
separation from bed and board shall have been previously renderedbetween the parties, and unless two years shall have expired from the date
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divorce could be granted in the same decree that pronounced the
separation from bed and board.6 ' These codes provided that the wife
could not remarry until ten months after the dissolution of her
preceding marriage.
This restriction on remarriage was not imposed on the
husband.69 The Revised Civil Code of 1870 substantially reenacted
these provisions, with the disparate treatment of husbands and
wives who were guilty of adultery being eliminated. ° This fault-
based statutory scheme remained in effect, with various
amendments, until the enactment of La. Acts 1990, No. 1009,
Section 2, effective January 1, 1991, which established a general
no-fault divorce law that retained only two fault-based causes for
divorce: adultery and commission of a felony and sentence to death
or imprisonment at hard labor.7' That revision did not provide for
of the judgment of separation from bed and board, and no reconciliation
may have taken place; provided, that in the cases excepted above a
judgment of divorce may be granted in the same decree which pronounced
the separation of bed and board.
68. This unusual procedure of granting both the separation frombed and board
and the divorce in the same decree was carried forward in Article 139 of the
Revised Civil Code of 1870 and remained part of it for eighty-four years, although
it was not adopted in practice. The Supreme Court in Ledoux v. Her Husband, 10
La. Ann. 663 (1855), involving a husband who kept concubines in the common
dwelling, held that it is not necessary for the complaining spouse to pray for a
separation from bed and board as well as for a divorce and that it is not necessary
for the court to render a judgment both of separation from bed and board and
divorce, as the latter includes the former.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 31 (1808); La. Civ. Code art. 134 (1825). This
prohibition was carried forward in Revised La. Civ. Code of 1870, art. 137: "The
wife shall not be at liberty to contract another marriage, until ten months after the
dissolution of her preceding marriage."
70. Revised La. Civ. Code arts. 138, 139 (1870).
71. 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 2 (effective Jan 1, 1991), enacted, inter alia,
La. Civ. Code arts. 102, 103. La. Civ. Code art. 102, as amended by 1991 La. Acts
No. 367, 1993 La. Acts No. 107, 1995 La. Acts No. 386, and 1997 La. Acts No.
1380, § 1 (effective July 15, 1997) provides:
Except in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted upon
motion of a spouse when either spouse has filed a petition for divorce and
upon proof that one hundred eighty days have elapsed from the service of
the petition, or from the execution of written waiver of the service, and
that the spouses have lived separate and apart continuously for at least one
hundred eighty days prior to the filing of the rule to show cause. The
motion shall be a rule to show cause filed after all such delays have
elapsed.
La. Civ. Code art. 103, as amended by 1991 La. Acts No. 918 and 1997 La. Acts
No. 1380, § I (effective July 15, 1997) provides:
Except in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted on
the petition of a spouse upon proof that:
(1) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously for a
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legal separation.72 In the latter years of this pre-1990 period,
questions were raised concerning fault as the exclusive basis for
divorces and separation judgments, and legislative inroads were
made in this fault-based statutory scheme, reflecting trends also
occurring in other states.
During this period, several no-fault causes for divorce, based
upon voluntarily living separate and apart, were enacted. The
original seven year period of living separate and apart enacted in
1916 3 was reduced to four years74 in 1932, next to two years75 in
1938, then to one year76 in 1979, and finally in the 1990 revision to
six months."
VII. LOUISIANA NO-FAULT DIVORCE LEGISLATION
In the 1980s, the Persons Committee and the Council of the Law
Institute ("Law Institute") recommended a revision of Louisiana
divorce law, which resulted in the enactment of the present no-fault
divorce law. 7' Early in its deliberations, the Persons Committee
established six specific objections or goals in the revision of divorce
law in Louisiana:
(1) The law should recognize that, because marriage is a
personal relationship entered into for complex personal and
social reasons, the parties to a marriage are in the best
position to know when it has ceased to serve its intended
purposes; (2) dissolution of marriage should be as amicable
as possible, and the law should encourage civility in
dissolution actions by making them non-adversarial in
nature; (3) the law should promote reconciliation between
spouses by imposing a reasonable waiting period in all
divorce actions; (4) the law should seek to avoid the adverse
effects on the judicial system occasioned by fault-based and
period of six months or more on the date the petition is filed; or(2) The other spouse has committed adultery; or(3) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to
death or imprisonment at hard labor.
72. 1997 La. Acts No. 1380 (effective July 15, 1997), the Louisiana
Covenant Marriage Act, does provide for separation from bed and board. See La.
R.S. 9:307-309 (2000).
73. 1916 La. Acts No. 269.
74. 1932 La. Acts No. 31.
75. 1938 La. Acts No. 430.
76. 1979 La. Acts No. 360.
77. La. Civ. Code arts. 102, 103(1); 1990 La. ActsNo. 1009, § 2 (effective Jan.
1, 1991).
78: 1990 La. Acts No. 1009.
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complex no-fault schemes; (5) the law should encourage
spouses to resolve the incidents of dissolution of marriage
between themselves whenever possible; (6) simple divorce
procedures should be available in simple cases in order to
insure that everyone has access to the courts in this area.79
The Persons Committee recommended the abandonment of a
statutory fault-based divorce scheme because of a belief that such
fault causes fail to reflect that divorce is usually an incremental
process rather than a catastrophic one traceable to specific acts. 0
To require fault grounds adversely affects the judicial system by
increasing the caseload and encouraging perjury."
The Persons Committee and the Council of the Law Institute
initially were concerned that a no-fault system of divorce would
encourage an increase in the overall rate of divorce.s2 It was
concluded, however, that empirical evidence existed that no-fault
divorce laws do not promote divorce, although such laws may
contribute to other inequities.8 3  The Law Institute, through its
Council, recommended that the Louisiana Legislature enact
legislation that would establish a general no-fault divorce statutory
scheme, while retaining two fault causes for divorce.
VIII. COMMENTARIES
There has been a profusion of legal, social science, and other
disciplinary literature attempting to associate or disassociate the
enactment of no-fault divorce legislation with the number and rate of
divorce. 5 Correlations may be demonstrated in certain instances.
79. Rigby & Spaht, supra note 55, at 22.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 22-23 and authorities cited at 23 n.9.
82. Id. at 26.
83. Id. and authorities cited at 26 n.16, 27 n.17.
84. La. Civ. Code art. 103 provides, in part:
Except in the case of a covenant marriage, divorce shall be granted on the
petition of a spouse upon proof that:
(2) The other spouse has committed adultery; or
(3) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to
death or imprisonment at hard labor.
The exception for covenant marriage was enacted by 1997 La. Acts No. 1380, § 1(effective July 15, 1997).
85. One of the more recent commentaries is Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates,
Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34
Farn. L.Q. 1 (2000), a publication of the Section of Family Law, American Bar
Association. In this article, Ellman reviews (1) the statistical data on marriage and
divorce rates, (2) the competing hypotheses that changes in divorce laws cause
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However, the infinite variables that induce or deter divorce that
cannot be eliminated in any statistical analysis make impossible a
conclusion of a causal connection between the two with any degree
of reliable statistical probability. For example, the following are the
number of Louisiana divorces and the crude divorce rates (divorces
per 1,000 population in Louisiana) for the years indicated:

















changes in divorce rates and that changes in divorce rates causes changes in divorce
laws, and the hypothesis that increasing divorce rates and no-fault reform are both
the products of changing cultural norms, increasing social mobility, and (3) the
improving economic status of women in the workforce. See also Heather Flory, I
Promise to Love, Honor, Obey... and Not Divorce You: "Covenant Marriage and
the Backlash Against No-Fault Divorce, 34 Faro. L.Q. 133 (2000) (providing an
insightful review of Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Act and discussing both its
strengths and weaknesses). This article by Ms. Flory was the first place winner in











As seen above, the number of divorces and the crude
divorce rate in Louisiana commenced to increase significantly
in 1980, ten years before January 1, 1991, the effective date
of the no-fault divorce legislation. A review of the data with respect
to the number of divorces and the rate of divorce (both
crude and refined) in Louisiana for the period 1980-1990
and 1991-1995 does not establish any causal relationship between the
no-fault divorce law and either the number or rate of
divorce in Louisiana. Therefore, the Law Institute does not
believe that a case may be made either in support of or
in opposition to a no-fault divorce statutory scheme based
upon divorce statistics alone.
Some commentators have supported the return to fault-
based divorces because such a requirement gives the
economically disadvantaged spouse (usually the wife)
additional bargaining or negotiating strength. 6  This
86. Professor Allen Parkman of the University of New Mexico espouses this
view:
Economics can provide insights about why no-fault divorce resulted in the
deterioration of the financial situation of divorced women and the children
of divorced parents identified by Weitzman and Peters. Many of the
reformers appear to have been so preoccupied with reducing the hypocrisy
of the fault divorce system that few of them thought about the
consequences of the new system-consequences that included a decline
in the bargaining power of married women at divorce and, therefore, in
their financial situations after divorce. The California Governor's
Commission on the Family that initiated the fault divorce debate in that
state did not include any economists or financial analysts.
Often one party did not want a divorce and a more generous financial
settlement and custody of any children was necessary to induce that party
to initiate the lawsuit and provide the obligatory testimony.
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Problems developed with no-fault divorce because the reformers did not
recognize the interrelationship among laws concerning the grounds for
divorce, parental rights, and the financial condition of the spouses.
Changing one set of rules without changing the others destroyed a delicate
balance. Under the fault divorce statutes, the custodial and financial
settlements were commonly based on the negotiations of the parties, with
the spouse who did not want to dissolve the marriage having substantial
power over the outcome. With no-fault divorce eliminating negotiations
to establish the grounds for divorce, the previously disregarded laws that
governed the custodial and financial repercussions of divorce became
much more important-the financial condition of divorced women and
children of divorced parents deteriorated.
The Economics of Negotiation and Litigation
Economics conclude that individuals decide to settle a dispute or
litigate it based on the expected costs and benefits of the alternatives with
the incentive to settle a dispute increasing as the outcome of litigation
becomes more predictable. The incentives to settle or litigate in divorce
proceedings have some unique traits because of the role of the state.
Because the state was the party to a marriage, it also has to be a party to
the divorce. The courts will only grant a divorce when specific procedures
and standards have been met. Negotiated settlements were particularly
important during the period when the grounds for divorce were based on
fault because the outcome of litigation was reasonably predictable. One
of the spouses had to be at fault, but spouses opposed to divorce were
unlikely to make it easy to prove that they were at fault. Therefore, it was
difficult for individuals to dissolve a marriage when their spouse was
unwilling to cooperate. Litigation was then not only expensive, but it was
unlikely to be successful and a divorce was usually the result of a
negotiated settlement with evidence being produced to conform to the
legal standards.
Under fault divorce, the negotiations that resulted in the divorce
included the custodial and financial arrangements that were part of the
divorce. The importance of these negotiations changed dramatically with
the introduction of no-fault divorce, when the cooperation of the innocent
party was no longer required. A divorce could be obtained in many
jurisdictions by the unilateral action of one spouse. The emphasis in
divorce proceedings then shifted from the grounds for the divorce to the
custodial and financial arrangements. The range of issues subject to
negotiation was reduced. With less negotiating power in the hands of the
unwilling party, the minimum compensation acceptable to that party and
the maximum compensation offered by the other would be expected to
decrease.
(Gary) Becker also argues that although a change in the rules
would not change the incentives to reach a negotiated settlement, it would
change the bargaining power of the parties and thus he expected the
introduction of no-fault divorce to reduce the financial settlements
received by wives.
The deterioration in the financial condition of divorced women
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position assumes that the disadvantaged spouse has the grounds, or
causes, for divorce and that the other does not. The Law Institute
believes that any perceived inequities of this nature, which may result
in economic injury to a spouse or children of the marriage, should be
remedied by legislative changes in the laws governing child support
and spousal support and not by the reinstitution of fault as a
prerequisite to a divorce. In the distribution of marital property, many
states that have no-fault divorce laws consider the fault of a spouse as
one of the factors that a court must or may consider under the
statutory or jurisprudential law of the state governing the equitable
distribution of marital property.87 The equitable distribution laws
or community property laws of other states expressly provide that
marital property shall be distributed without regard to the fault of the
that has occurred since the introduction of no-fault divorce often has been
viewed as benefitting men. When no-fault divorce was introduced, there
were more men who obviously benefitted from the new legal
environment-the men who wanted to dissolve their marriage and found
the cost of divorce had been reduced benefitted from the reduced
negotiating power of their spouse.
The effects of no-fault divorce have often been viewed as a zero
sum game with the losses experienced by the divorced spouses, often
women, balanced by gains to divorcing spouses, often men. It may be
more appropriate to describe the effects of no-fault divorce as a negative
sum game, as the sum of the effects is probably negative.
Allen M. Parkman, No-Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong? 4-5,44-45, 103 (1992).
Professor Peter Swisher argues that fault based factors in no-fault divorce
continue to serve a useful and viable moral, social, economic, and legal purpose in
contemporary American society, and that therefore, fault-based statutory factors for
determining spousal support awards or for determining the distribution of marital
property on divorce should not be abolished or abrogated in those states that
continue to recognize and properly utilize these factors. Peter N. Swisher,
Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 Fain. L.Q. 269 (1997)
The issue is whether fault should be abolished as ground or cause for
divorce, yet legitimately retained for determining all or some of the incidents of
divorce, such as custody, child support, spousal support, and distribution of marital
property.
The restoration to the innocent spouse of her bargaining power by re-
instituting mandatory fault grounds for divorce is advocated by Katherine S. Spaht,
supra note 5, at 78. Professor Spaht argues that the innocent spouse's bargaining
power under a fault-based divorce regime can be exercised to insist upon serious
counseling in an effort to preserve the marriage, or barring counseling's success, to
demand financial advantages for herself and for her children.
87. Among the states in which the fault of the spouses expressly may be taken
into account or is required to be taken into account in the distribution of marital
property are Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Missouri, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West
Virginia. The Virgin Islands statute also mandates consideration of fault in the
distribution of marital property.
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spouses.8 8 In Louisiana, the equality of ownership and distribution of
community property reflect a strong public policy that should not be
changed. 89-
A. Surveys
In 1998, the Section of Family Law of the American Law
Association polled its approximately 6,000 members on whether or
not there should be a return to fault-based divorce. 90 More than 1,400
attorneys responded to the survey, an approximate response rate of
24%.9' Nearly 84% stated that they did not support a return to fault-
based divorces, describing it as a "bad idea."' Additionally, 69% of
the respondents did not agree that there was a direct correlation
between the increase of the divorce rate in the United States and the
advent of no-fault divorce twenty years ago.93 Sixty-seven percent of
the respondents agreed that no-fault divorces were typically quicker
than fault-based divorces; 69% believed no-fault divorces were less
expensive than fault-divorces, and 65% agreed that no-fault divorces
typically are less acrimonious than fault divorces. 94 However, 30%
of the respondents supported two systems of divorce, fault and no-
fault, based on whether the divorcing spouses are parents, while 66%
88. The states in which fault of the parties expressly may not be taken into
account in the distribution of marital property include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. Other states limit a consideration
of fault to dissipation of assets, concealment of assets, and economic fault. State
Divorce Laws, Fan. L. Rep. (BNA) § § 442:001-453:001 (1998).
89. This public policy is reflected in Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave,
Matrimonial Regimes § 3.2 at 47, in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1997):
From the earliest times, the most important legislative policy under-
pinning the Louisiana community property regime has been that spouses
share equally the produce of the reciprocal labor and industry of both
husband and wife. No matter how married couples organize their
lives-one earning income, the other managing the home; both working
for wages; neither earning wages and both producing things; or
whatever-the basic rule is that they share equally in whatever each
produces and accumulates. Historically, this policy protected the wife
who was not a wage earner by giving her a share in the husband's
accumulations of income. In more modem times, the policy fosters
equality as the household with two working spouses becomes more
common.
90. Press release, American Bar Association, Section of Family Law (Nov. 1,







did not support this differentiation.95 The large majority of the
respondents, when asked if a return to fault-based divorce would
solve the following problems related to the dissolution of marriage,
answered "No."'96 The percentages of negative responses were as
follows:
(1) Financial disparity between the divorcing
spouses-women consistently fare worse (86 percent);
(2) The abandonment of the family by those who are
unwilling or cannot abide the mandatory waiting periods
currently in place in 24 states (88 percent); and
(3) Unfairness to victims of domestic violence who
occasionally are treated with bias by the courts and/or in
the mediation process (85 percent)."'
When asked if no-fault divorces are emotionally easier on
children of the marriage, nearly 58% agreed that they are, but 37%
disagreed.98 Twenty-six percent of the respondents agreed that no-
fault divorce is more equitable in recognizing the father's rights in
custody, while 59% agreed that judges still do consider fault in
divorce related issues even if fault is not a statutory element of
that issue.99
One writer, commenting on the no-fault divorce law of
Louisiana'0° wrote:
People marry for very personal and individual reasons; the
same is true of divorce. The state cannot select a spouse
for one of its citizens, nor should it try to force a person to
remain in a marriage in which a satisfactory personal
relationship is no longer possible. The state may
encourage thoughtful reflection and decision making
through the procedures provided for the divorce process.
Or state coercion may be exercised by limiting the grounds
or causes for which a divorce may be obtained and
requiring cumbersome and burdensome procedures in
divorce actions. In both, the underlying policy is to
discourage hasty divorce. However, empirical evidence
suggests that such a public policy has not deterred
divorces. Cognizant of this, the committee included in its






100. 1990 La. Acts No. 1009.
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reconciliation, and instituting simple divorce procedures in
simple cases to ensure that everyone has access to the
courts in divorce cases.10'
Empirically confirming the view that persons do not divorce
for statutorily mandated causes, but rather for personal reasons, are
the results of a poll by the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers of its Fellows at an annual meeting of the Academy.'12
There, the Fellows were asked to give their opinion, based upon
their practice of divorce law, as to the principal causes of divorce
in America. The responses were:
Number of Responses
Listing A Cause in Top Two Causes for Divorce
Rank Cause Number of
Responses
1 Lack of communication 59
2 Divergent growth 41
3 Sex/Adultery 19
4 Money 17
5 Lack of understanding 17
6 Lack of mutual respect 15
7 Feelings of inequality 12
8 Initial mistake 11
9 Changing values 8
10 Drinking 7
11 Mid-life crisis 6
12 Boredom 5
13 Selfishness 2
14 Physical abuse 1
14 Sexual preference 1
101. Rigby & Spaht, supra note 55, at 48 (emphasis added).
102. Report of Survey conducted at the Fall Annual Meeting of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) held in Chicago, Illinois, on November
12-13, 1982. AAML, established in 1962, consists of 1500 lawyers specializing
in family law. Membership as a Fellow is by invitation only.
588 [Vol. 62
KENNETH RIGB Y
It is significant that only one of the top five causes given for
divorce, Sex/Adultery, and only two of the top ten causes given for
divorce, Sex/Adultery and Drinking, are traditional fault grounds for
divorce. Only four of the fifteen top reasons assigned for divorce
are traditional fault grounds for divorce-Sex/Adultery (3rd),
Drinking (10th), Physical Abuse and Sexual Preference (14th). The
only traditional fault ground in Louisiana reported as a substantial
reason for divorce is adultery, which is a cause for divorce in
Louisiana Civil Code article 103(2). This cause should be retained.
In 2000, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
published a booklet entitled "Making Marriage Last: A Guide to
Preventing Divorce," which was designed to help couples identify
and correct the problems in their marriage in order to avoid the
financially and emotionally draining process of divorce. Published
eighteen years after the Academy's survey discussed above, the
booklet lists the following reasons for divorce its Fellows "hear..
more often than others:"
Poor communication
Financial problems
A lack of commitment to the marriage
A dramatic change in priorities
Infidelity
The booklet indicates that poor communication remains the number
one cause for divorce; money problems has come up in the polls;
infidelity has slipped; and divergent growth/change in priorities still
ranks in the top five.
The 2000 publication also lists the following causes, which the
Fellows "see a lot, but not quite as often as those listed above:"
Failed expectations or unmet needs
Addictions and substance abuse
Physical, sexual or emotional abuse
Lack of conflict resolution skills
These remaining principal causes for divorce are not
dramatically different from those listed eighteen years earlier. Lack
of conflict resolution skills appears to be new, and the various forms
of abuse of the other spouse appears to be ranked higher in the year
2000 than in 1982. In these intervening years, there does not appear
to be any dramatic shift in the reasons people give for divorcing
their spouses.
The results of these surveys should be compared with the
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findings of Lynn Gigy and Joan B. Kelly. °3 Their Divorce and
Mediation Project sampled 437 persons who were in the divorcing
process in Marin County, California, during the 1983-1986 period.
The respondents had been married an average of 13.3 years prior to
separation. 75% of the men and 54.4% of the women had finished
college or obtained advanced degrees. 75% of the women were
engaged in full time or part time work, and the median combined
household income was $59,000.00. The mean age of the men was42.37 years; and that of the women was 39.35 years. The authors
summarized the results:
Table 3 gives the self-reported reasons for divorce factors in
order of frequency of response. For both men and women,
the two most frequent factors contributing to divorce
included Unmet Emotional Needs/Gradual Growing Apart,
and Serious Lifestyle Differences/Boredom. Divorce for
reasons of a High Conflict/Demeaning Relationship is third
most frequent, particularly for women.'
Women were more likely to cite Unmet Emotional
Needs/Growing Apart as important in the breakdown of
their marriage, although for men it ranked highest among the
factors as well. Women were also more likely than men to
report High Conflict/Demeaning Relationship, Spouse's
Jealousy, Substance Abusing/Unreliable Spouse, and Career
and Role Conflict factors as reasons for their divorce. Men
had a significantly higher mean score on the factor reflecting
their own substance abuse and affairs. Men and women
were equally likely to give Life Style Differences/Boredom,
Financial and Employment Problems, and Severe Illness as
reasons for divorce. 10M




1 Unmet Emotional Needs/Growing .63 .70
Apart I
103. Lynn Gigy & Joan Kelly, Reasons for Divorce.: Perspectives of Divorcing
Men and Women, 18 J. Divorce & Remarriage 169, 169-87 (1992).
104. Id. at 177-78.
105. Id. at 179.
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1 Lifestyle Differences/Boredom .42 .48
2 Demeaning/Violent Relationship .29 .38
3 Financial/Employment Problems .30 .32
4 Spouse's Jealousy .23 .36
5 Substance Abusing/Unreliable .A9 .32
Spouse
2 Career and Role Conflicts .19 .30
6 Respondent's Substance .14 .06
Abuse/Affairs
3 Severe Illness .06 .09
Gigy and Kelly report the following socio-demographic changes
and shifts in cultural attitudes in self-reported reasons for divorce in
the last fifty years:
Studies of the reasons for marital breakdown from the
perspective of divorced men and women have provided
sociocultural, psychological and historical insight into divorce
over the past several decades (Cleek and Pearson, 1985;
Goode, 1956; Kelly, 1982; Kitson and Sussman, 1982;
Kitson, Babri and Roach, 1985; Thumher, Fenn, Melichar and
Chiriboga, 1983). Despite differing methodological
approaches and samples, the data from studies focusing on
self-reported reasons for divorce reflect socio-demographic
changes and shifts in cultural attitudes. Salient among the
early studies of marital complaints at the time of divorce is
William Goode's 1948 research on divorced women. The
marital complaints mentioned most frequently in 1948
concerned objective and specific negative behaviors, such as
non-support, heavy drinking or neglect. Twenty-five years
after Goode's study, Kitson and Sussman explored the nature
and correlates of marital complaints of divorcing people and
found that women's more frequent complaints had shifted
from specific negative behaviors to affective or emotional
deficiencies in the marriage (Kitson and Sussman, 1982).
Soon after Kitson and Sussman's data collection, a 1976-1977
study also found complaints to be more abstract and affective
in nature with the most frequently cited reasons of
"conflicting lifestyles," and "spouse wants freedom"
2002]
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(Thumher, Fenn, Melichar and Chiriboga, 1983). Cleek and
Pearson (1985) found that communication problems, basic
unhappiness, and incompatibility were the most frequently
cited reasons for divorce. In a Danish sample, "growing
apart" was the most frequently cited reasons for divorce
among both the men and women (Koch-Nielsen and
Gundelach, 1985).
The California Divorce Project found substantial
evidence that men and women had different perceptions of
the reasons for their divorces (Kelly, 1982; Wallerstein &
Kelly, 1980). In the California Divorce Project, the women
most frequently complained of feeling unloved, having their
competence and intelligence constantly belittled by their
spouses, and feeling that their spouses were hypercritical of
everything about them. On the other hand, the complaint
mentioned most frequently by the men was that their
spouses were inattentive, and neglectful of what the
husbands saw as their needs and wishes. Among the men,
this complaint was followed in frequency by incompatibility
of interest and values from the beginning of the marriage
(Kelly, 1982).106
These views by family law practitioners and specialists
throughout the United States, and the results of surveys of persons
who are divorcing or have divorced '07 indicate that most people
106. Id. at 169-70.
107. A poll, interesting both with respect to the nature of the poll and its results,
was reported by the Associated Press. It read:
Baptists have the highest divorce rate of any Christian
denomination, and are more likely to get a divorce than atheists and
agnostics, according to a national survey.
The survey conducted by Barna Research Group in Ventura,
Calif., found that 29 percent of all adult Baptists have been through a
divorce. Among Christian groups, only those who attend
nondenominational Protestant churches were more likely to be divorced,
with a 34 percent divorce rate.
Alabama, with a population of 4.3 million, has more than one
million Southern Baptists and a majority of evangelical Protestants. The
state ranks fourth nationally in divorce rates, behind Nevada, Tennessee
and Arkansas, according to U. S. government statistics.
Barna Research Group interviewed 3,854 adults from the 48
continental states, with a margin of error of plus or minus 2 percent. The
survey found that while just 11 percent of the adult population is currently
divorced, 25 percent of all adults have experienced at least one divorce,
the survey showed.
Twenty-seven percent of those describing themselves as born-
again Christians are currently or have previously been divorced, compared
to 24 percent among other adults.
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divorce for personal reasons that are not associated with any
statutory fault grounds for divorce. This conclusion is consistent
with the unanimous experiences of the Board Certified Family Law
Specialists of the Divorce Committee of the Law Institute.
B. Other Possible Solutions
Although perhaps beyond the scope of the legislative
request,' the Law Institute suggests that legislative efforts
be directed toward other means of attempting to reduce
the number and rate of divorces. Although this report
does not advocate any particular process or requirement
discussed herein, social scientists, legal experts, and others
"While it may be alarming to discover that born again Christians
are more likely than others to experience a divorce, that pattern has been
in place for quite some time," said George Barna, president of Barna
Research Group.
A Birmingham minister, the Rev. Stacy Pickering, said the
numbers are skewed because Baptist churches encourage young people to
get married-sometimes before they're ready-before living together.
"Fewer people are getting married and the number of couples
living together has increased," said Pickering, minister of young married
adults and director of counseling at Shades Mountain Baptist Church.
He said his church now requires premarital counseling for couples
who want to marry at the church.
Of major Christian denominations, Catholics and Lutherans have
the lowest divorce rate at 21 percent, according to Barna. People who
attend mainstream Protestant churches have an overall divorce rate of 25
percent.
The levels vary among non-Christian groups, Barna reported.
Jews have a divorce rate of 30 percent, while atheists and agnostics have
a relatively low rate of 21 percent, according to the survey.
The survey found that Mormons, who emphasize strong families,
are near the national average at 24 percent.
The study found that the South and Midwest had 27 percent
divorce rates, while the rates were 19 percent in the Northwest and 26
percent in the West.
Whites are more likely to be have had [sic] a divorce, at 27
percent, than African-Americans (22 percent), Hispanics (20 percent) and
Asians (8 percent), Barna found.
George Barna noted that young people have changed.
"One of the most striking findings in our recent survey among
teenagers is that when we asked them to name their top goals for the
future, one of the highest-rated was to get married and have the same
spouse for their entire life," he said.
Baptists Have Higher Divorce Rate Than Any Denomination, Shreveport Times,
Dec. 31, 1999, at4A.
108. The Legislative mandate to the Law Institute inH.R., Reg. Sess., No. 1 (La.
1998) is to "study and make recommendations to the Civil Law and Procedure
Committee as to the merits of reinstating fault as a prerequisite to a divorce."
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have suggested a variety of processes designed to foster
a more meaningful view of marriage, a more thoughtful
entry into marriage, dispute resolution mechanisms during
marriage, and pre-divorcing requirements.' 9
109. Numerous articles in professional journals and other publications have
addressed various facets of these issues. The following are some of the literature
made available to the Divorce Committee of the Law Institute for its review. In turn
these articles cite and discuss numerous other studies and references. The
Committee recognizes that there are numerous other articles not included in this list.
1. Premarital Inventory, Counseling, and Other Premarital Measure
Lee Williams and Joan Jurich conducted a study of the predictive validity
ofFOCCUS (Facilitating Open Couple Communication, Understanding and Study),
which is used by approximately two thirds of the Roman Catholic dioceses in the
United States and by over 500 Protestant churches of different denominations.
They also discuss PREPARE, an 125 question inventory designed to assess
relationship strengths and weak areas for engaged couples and compare the
predictive validity of FOCCUS and PREPARE. The authors conclude that
FOCCUS and PREPARE are comparable in terms of their predictive validity.The
study targeted couples who had been married 4 to 5 years and had completed the
FOCCUS instrument prior to marriage. The authors claim that FOCCUS scores
were able to predict successfully in 67.6% to73.9% of the cases (depending upon
the scoring method used) the couples with high quality marriages versus those with
poor quality marriages, and that FOCCUS scores could be used to identify 75% of
the couples who later developed distressed marriage.
If FOCCUS and PREPARE have strong predictive validity, the authors
suggest that these instruments may help identify couples who are at risk in
developing distressed marriages, and if a couple were confirmed to be at risk after
further evaluation, then they could be encouraged to extend their engagement,
reevaluate their decision to marry, or seek additional preparation through structured
programs or premarital counseling. Lee Williams & Joan Jurich, Predicting
Marital Success After Five Years: Assessing the Predictive Validity of FOCCUS,
21 J. Marital & FamilyTherapy 141, 141-153 (1995).
2. Dispute Resolution During Marriage
Guy Bodenmann postulates that the deterioration of marital relationships
is in most cases due to a lack of competencies among partners, especially
deficiencies in communication skills, problem-solving capacities and coping. The
author recommends CCET (Couple's Coping Enhancement Training) for the dual
purposes of (a) the enhancement of individual and dyadic coping and (b)
communication and problem-solving skills during marriage as a preventative
measure. Because most couples seek marital therapy at a stage when their
relationship is already largely dysfunctional, only about 40% benefit from
intervention. CCET is a preventive-oriented approach, in which couples are taught
dyadic coping skills prior to the occurrence of major marital problems. The training
consists of six sequential units: Theoretical Introduction, Facilitating a Better
Understanding of Stress and Coping, The Enhancement ofDyadic Coping, Fairnessin the Relationship, Communication Skills, and Conflict and Problem-SolvingSkills. The authors conclude that couples who participated in preventive training
programs were significantly more satisfied with their relationship and showed a
lower rate ofdivorce. While 30% of the control group's marriages dissolved within
2002] KENNETH RIGBY 595
a time span of three years, only 10% of the intervention group separated or divorced
within this same time period. Guy Bodenmann, Can Divorce Be Prevented by
Enhancing the Coping Skills of Couples?, 27 J. Divorce & Remarriage 177, 177-91
(1997).
The Civil Codes of some countries provide for some types of judicial
recourse to resolve an impasse between parents with respect to their common
authority over the child. Article 156 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that in
case of disagreement between the parties in the exercise of parental authority, either
may resort to the court. The court is given the authority to grant parental authority
on the disputed issue to either the father or the mother. French Civil Code article
374 provides that a court may decide, upon the request of either parent or of the
prosecuting attorney (minist~re public), which parent of an illegitimate child may
exercise parental authority.
Although it would be a drastic departure from traditional views of the
function of courts and other decision-making fora, mediation and reconciliation
courts and other adjudicatory agencies might be established to address intra-
marriage problems.
The benefit of seeking both pre-marital counseling and marital counseling
in times of marital difficulties during the marriage is recognized in the provisions
of Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law. La. R.S. 9:273 (2000) regulates the
contents of a declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage executed pursuant
to La. R.S. 9:272 and requires an affidavit by the parties that they have received
premarital counseling from designated types of persons, which counseling must
include a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling in times of marital
difficulties.
3. Mediation, Arbitration. and Other Interventions as Pre-Divorcing Requirements
The value of voluntary or court-ordered mediation has been statutorily
recognized in child custody and visitation disputes. See La. R.S. 9.:331-334 (2000);
see also La. R.S. 9:306 (2000) for court-ordered attendance at and completion of
a court-approved seminar designed to educate and inform parents of the needs of
their children, in a custody or visitation proceeding.
The Louisiana Mediation Act, La. R.S. 9:4101-4112, applies to all civil
cases except those types of proceedings excepted in La. R.S. 9:4103. The
Louisiana Binding Arbitration Law, La. R.S. 9:4201-4217, applies where there
exists a written contract to settle by arbitration any specified controversy or any
controversy existing and thereafter arising between the parties to the contract.
Other states have mandatory mediation for contested custody, visitation,
and other issues, arbitration for property matters and mediation and conciliation
courts whose function is to attempt to effect reconciliation. States which require
or permit a court to order one or more of these alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms include California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin.
State Divorce Laws, Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) §§ 442:001-453.001 (1999). For a more
complete discussion of alternative approaches to dispute resolution in family law
cases and cataloguing the availability of conciliation, mediation, and other available
alternates, see Rigby, supra note 2.
The mediation approach to dispute resolution might be explored for issues
other than child custody and visitation as a required prerequisite to court
proceedings in a divorce suit. The focus would be on the spouses resolving, if
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These suggestions and proposals are designed to reduce the
possibility of the "initial mistake," to provide both opportunities and
methods for resolving spousal differences during marriage by some
mechanism short of a divorce, and to provide or require mediation,
counseling, or similar processes as a prerequisite to obtaining a
divorce. Divorce is a failure. It is the failure of a relationship, the
failure of a societal institution, the failure of people to realize their
hopes and expectations within that institution, and the failure of the
preferred parental module: parents married to each other, jointly
rearing, educating, guiding, and directing their children into
productive adulthood.
Efforts to preserve marriage should not focus only on divorcing
requirements, but on three other areas: pre-marriage requirements,
facilitation of dispute resolution during the marriage, and pre-
divorcing requirements.
Pre-marriage requirements, which might assist the state in
achieving these goals, include mandatory pre-marriage counseling" 0
or seminars, compatibility testing,"' longer delays between the
issuance of a marriage license and the marriage ceremony," 2
possible, their disputes and differences in order to preserve both the marriage and
the quality of the marriage, rather than an alternate means to reach a decision on an
issue or issues in the divorce proceedings. Intervention in the interspousal
relationship of the spouses "at a stage when their relationship is already largely
dysfunctional," must be viewed realistically, and may not result in the preservation
of the marriage in most cases. Bodenmann, supra, at 180. However, the benefits
might include an identification and clarification of the fundamental issues, which
may have become obscured by more emotional issues, an attempt to reconcile these
differences, a requirement that a spouse state to the other spouse whether he or she
desires to continue the marriage, and a realistic determination of whether the
marriage can be salvaged or should be salvaged. If nothing else, it might require
the spouses to talk to each other about things they have never talked about with each
other, but which are the reasons that they are where they are in their marital and
interpersonal relationship.
The Louisiana Covenant Marriage Act provides that a spouse may obtain
ajudgment ofdivorce or a judgment of separation from bed and board, respectively,
"subsequent to the parties obtaining counseling." La. R.S. 9:307(A) and (B)
(2000). This provision does not constitute a necessary prerequisite to the action for
divorce or separation; rather, that the legislature intended that this obligation be
legally enforceable through contractual remedies. Spaht, supra note 5, at 96.
110. A thoughtful discussion of the purpose of the mandatory pre-marital
counseling provision of Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law, La. R.S. 9:273, is
contained in Spaht, supra note 5, at 84.
111. See Williams & Jurich, supra note 109 (discussing FOCCUS and
PREPARE).
112. The required delay between the issuance of the marriage license and the
performance of the marriage ceremony is seventy-two hours. La. R.S. 9:241
(2000). This delay may be waived by a judge or a justice of the peace authorized
to perform the marriage upon application of the parties for serious and meritorious
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increased tax incentives for marriage, reduction in the fee for the
marriage license if the couple agree to specified marriage
counseling, and the required teaching in public schools of courses
concerning marriage and relationship skills. This list is far from
exhaustive.
There are ways to encourage and facilitate dispute resolution
between spouses during the marriage. These include required
periodic "check ups" with designated types of mental health
professionals or marriage or other counselors, available judicial
intervention for the resolution of limited types of inter-spousal
disputes or differences," 13 required mediation or arbitration of these
specified disputes or differences, and other types of interventions
during the marriage. The Law Institute is sensitive to the
constitutional right to privacy issues implicated in state intervention
in an intact mamage and reiterates that it is not suggesting nor
supporting these measures, but is documenting suggestions that
have been made to address these issues. The state's authority to
mandate the requirements for marriage and for the termination of
marriage, within reason, does not appear to raise these
constitutional concerns."'5
reasons. La. R.S. 9:242 (2000).
113. See supra note 109 (discussing the availability of judicial intervention to
resolve certain types of intra-spousal disputes).
114. La. Const. art. 1, § 5 expressly guarantees that every individual shall be
secure in his "person" against "unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy." One aspect of "liberty" protected by both the federal and the state
constitutions is a right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
of privacy. This right of personal privacy includes the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions. Among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 760 (La. 1992). Under
the Louisiana Constitution, the standard of 'strict judicial scrutiny' is applied to
review state action which imposes a burden on decisions as fundamental as those
included within the right of personal privacy. Under this test, the state action 'may
be justified only by a compelling state interest, and the state action must be
narrowly confined so as to further only that compelling interest.'State v.
Gamberella, 633 So. 2d 595, 604 (La. App. 1st Cir.1993) (quoting Perry, 610 So.
2d at 760). The family has a right to be protected against unwarranted intrusion by
the state. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972); State in Interest
of Delcuze, 407 So. 2d 707, 710 (La. 1981); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). However, the constitutional protection ofthe right
of privacy is not unlimited. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986); State v. McCoy, 337 So. 2d 192, 196 (La. 1976); State v. Neal, 500 So. 2d
374, 378 (La. 1987).
115. See Land v. Land, 183 La. 588, 591-98, 164 So. 599, 600-01 (1935);
Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 297-99, 179 So. 430, 433 (1938); Wilkinson v.
Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120, 126 (La. 1975).
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There are many alternatives for a pre-divorcing requirement.
Mediation, arbitration, or counseling could be required. There could
be a requirement for an agreement concerning custody, support, and
property matters prior to the rendition of a divorce decree. There
could be longer "cooling off" periods."16  The defense of
reconciliation' -could be eliminated to encourage spouses to attempt to
continue the marriage without the risk of losing the cause or ground for
divorce. Custody seminars and seminars concerning the financial,
emotional, and societal costs of divorce and its effect on the children of
the marriage could be required.
The state has a legitimate and important interest in preventing or
reducing "initial mistake" marriages, in improving the quality of the
marriage of its citizens, in making available or requiring the mechanisms
for alternate dispute resolution of marital disputes, and in preventing or
116. As noted earlier at notes 73-77and accompanying text, the required living
separate and apart for a no-fault divorce was originally set at seven years in 1916,
reduced to four years in 1932, to two years in 1938, to one year in 1979, and to six
months in 1990. The Persons Committee of the Law Institute, in its task of
proposing to the Council of the Law Institute revisions in the law of divorce, which
culminated in the enactment of La. Acts 1990, No. 1009 (effective Jan. 1, 1991),
originally considered a waiting period of ninety days if the spouses had been
married for a stipulated minimum period of time and the parties had confected and
filed with the petition for divorce a written implementation plan containing
provisions for custody and support of children, spousal support, injunctive relief,
and other incidental matters. The Committee ultimately rejected this expedited
procedure. See Rigby & Spaht, supra note 55, at 29.
Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Act, 1997 La. Acts No. 1380, permits the
obtaining of a no-fault divorce, but lengthens the waiting period to two years. La.
R.S. 9:307A(5) (2000). See Spaht, supra note 5, at 126. The waiting period for the
filing of a motion for a La. Civ. Code art. 102 no-fault divorce is 180 days after the
parties have commenced living separate and apart continuously and 180 days after
service of the petition for divorce or execution of written waiver of service.
See Elrod, supra note 56, at Chart 4 (revealing living separate and apart
requirements ranging from sixty days to three years. The average waiting period
is 17.07 months; the mean of the waiting periods is 19 months; the median is 15
months).
117. La. Civ. Code art. 104 provides: "The cause of action for divorce is
extinguished by the reconciliation of the parties." The Revision Comment to La.
Civ. Code art. 104 states that the article "codifies the prior jurisprudence holding
that an action for divorce under former Civil Code Article 139 or R.S. 9:301 (now
Article 103, supra) could be defeated by proof that the parties had reconciled," and
that reconciliation may also defeat a divorce action under La. Civ. Code art. 102.
What constitutes reconciliation is a question of fact to be determined in
accordance with established jurisprudential guidelines. Id. Reconciliation occurs
when there is mutual intent to reestablish the marital relationship on a permanent
basis, although there may have been sexual relations between the spouses during the
requisite period of time. Garrett v. Garrett, 324 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976);
Millon v. Millon, 352 So. 2d 325, 327 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Lemoine v.
Lemoine, 715 So. 2d 1244, 1246-49 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998). See also Rigby &
Spaht, supra note 55, at 77.
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reducing the termination of these marriages by divorce. The Law
Institute applauds the interest of the Legislature in marriage and
encourages it to explore any available and productive means of
preserving it both for the benefit of the state and the citizens of the
state, including importantly, the children of the marriage.
Community and other private initiatives are important. A local
non-governmental effort to reduce divorce occurred on Friday,
November 10, 2000. On that date, clergy representing fourteen
Shreveport, Louisiana, congregations signed a pledge that adopted
a program called a "Community Marriage Covenant." Through this
pledge, the participating churches agreed to ten stipulations to be
observed by those churches, in an attempt to reduce the number and
rate of divorces.
The agreement's stipulations include:
1. A minimum of four months between when the
wedding is scheduled and occurs.
2. Six premarital counseling sessions.
3. A premarital inventory or test.
4. Promotion of abstinence before marriage and
fidelity during.
5. Identification and training of married couples to
mentor couples who are engaged, newlyweds or
those who marriages are in trouble.
6. Encouragement for newlyweds to meet during
their first year with the mentor couple or pastor.
7. Regular enrichment for married couples.
8. Training of couples whose marriages nearly
failed to mentor couples considering divorce.
9. Counseling and support to encourage
reconciliation of divorced or separated couples.
10. Creation of a stepfamily support group.
The Shreveport Times 2 ' issue reported that Shreveport is the
third Louisiana city, and the one hundred and thirty-third
nationwide, to take such a step. The report stated that the City of
Modesto, California, started this program in 1986 and has since
seen a 30 percent reduction in its divorce rate or approximately
1,000 divorces a year. El Paso, Texas had a similar reduction of 33
percent in its divorce rate after adopting the program.
120. Alisa Stingley, Faith Community Targets Divorce, Shreveport Times,
Nov. 11, 2000, at 3B.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The Louisiana State Law Institute does not recommend to the
Louisiana Legislature the reinstitution of fault as a requirement for
obtaining a divorce in Louisiana. Such a requirement does not address
the reasons given by the large majority of people for instituting a divorce
proceeding. There is no persuasive evidence that it would preserve
marriage as an important societal institution. It would not improve the
quality of a marriage even if it prolonged a marriage. A fault
requirement would invite and provide an additional forum for accusation
and recrimination. It would be an inappropriate method of equalizing
economic disparity between spouses. Rather, alternate methods
designed to discourage hasty and ill-advised marriages, to preserve and
improve both the quality of marriage and its longevity and to preserve
the traditional marriage as an vital societal unit should be explored.
KENNETH RIGBY
APPENDIX A
Regular Session, 1998 ENROLLED
HOUSE RESOLUTION NO. 1
BY REPRESENTATIVE DIMOS
A RESOLUTION
To urge and request the Louisiana State Law Institute to study and
make recommendations to the Civil Law and Procedure
Committee relative to the requirement of fault as a prerequisite to
a divorce.
WHEREAS, on September 5, 1969, California enacted the first
no-fault divorce law and within five years thereof forty-four other
states enacted similar legislation; and
WHEREAS, the state of Louisiana also enacted similar no-fault
legislation pursuant to which a majority of divorces in this state are
granted; and
WHEREAS, Louisiana's "no-fault" grounds are provided in Civil
Code Articles 102 and 103 which simply require that the spouses
have lived separate and apart for one hundred eighty days prior to the
filing of the rule to show cause, or that the spouses have lived
separate and apart continuously for a period of six months or more on
the date the petition is filed; and
WHEREAS, according to a news release of the American Bar
Association, nearly thirty years after no-fault divorce was first
introduced in the United States, many state legislators are trying to
reinstate fault as a prerequisite for divorce in their states.
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the House of
Representatives of the Legislature of Louisiana does hereby request
that the Louisiana State Law Institute study and make
recommendations to the Civil Law and Procedure Committee as to
the merits of reinstating fault as a prerequisite to a divorce.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that a copy of this Resolution be
transmitted to the director of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2002]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
Page 1 of2
- L E A P ----------------------------------
Center for Business 6 Economic Research
Northeast Louisiana University, Monroe, Louisiana 71209-0101
Tel: 318-342-1215; Faxs318-342-1209
NUMBER AND RATE OF ARRIAGES AND DIVORCES
UNITED STATES AND LOUISIAZNA
1960-1995
Marriages Divorces
United States Louisiana United States Louisiana
Year Number Rats Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate
1960 1,523,000 8.5 23,523 7.2 393,000 2.2 4,412 1.4
1961 1,548,000 8.5 24,057 7.3 414,000 2.3 5,412 1.6
1962 1,577,000 8.5 24,630 7.3 413,000 2.2 4,016 1.2
1963 1,654,000 8.8 26,013 7.6 428.000 2.3 3,415 1.0
1964 1,725,000 9.0 27,086 7.8 450,000 2.4 4,704 1.4
1965 1,800,000 9.3 20,972 8.1 479.000 2.5 4,623 1.3
1966 1,857,000 9.5 30,694 8.5 499,000 2.5 3,452 1.0
1967 1,927,000 9.7 31,661 8.6 523,000 2.6 3,149 0.9
1968 2,069,000 10.4 33,899 9.1 584,000 2.9 3,826 1.1
1969 2,145,000 10.6 34,540 9.2 639,000 3.2 4,885 1.3
1970 2,159,000 10.6 35,416 9.7 700,000 3.5 5,065 1.4
1971 2,191,000 10.6 36,648 10.0 773,000 3.7 9,431 2.5
1972 2,282,000 11.0 38,981 10.4 845,000 4.1 10,618 2.8
1973 2,284,000 10.9 39,498 10.5 915,000 4.4 7,294 1.9
1974 2,230,000 10.5 38,185 10.1 977,000 4.6 7,812 2.0
1975 2,153,000 10.1 37,309 9.8 1,036,000 4.9 8,720 2.2
1976 2,155,000 10.0 37,999 9.9 1,083,000 5.0 12,550 3.2
1977 2,178,000 10.1 38,645 9.9 1,091,000 5.0 12,910 3.2
1978 2,202,000 10.5 39,877 10.0 1,130,000 5.2 13,229 3.3
1979 2,331,000 10.4 41,347 10.0 1,181,000 5.3 15,170 3.7
1980 2,390,000 10.6 43,460 10.3 1,189,000 5.2 18,108 4.3
1981 2,422,000 10.6 44,929 10.5 1,213,000 5.3 17,397 4.0
1902 2,456,000 10.6 45,581 10.4 1,170,000 5.0 16,765 3.8
1983 2,446,000 10.5 43,177 9.7 1,158,000 4.9 16,204 3.6
1984 2,477,000 10.5 41,087 9.2 1,169,000 5.0 13,094 3.1
1985 2,413,000 10.1 39,368 8.8 1,190,000 5.0 17,608 3.9
1986 2,407,000 10.0 37,457 8.3 1,170,000 4.9 13,173 3.4
1987 2,403,000 9.9 36,185 8.1 1,166,000 4.8 9,532 2.1
1988 2,396,000 9.7 33,974 7.7 1,167,000 4.7 9,534 1.9
1989 2,404,000 9.7 38,574 8.8 1,163,000 4.7 10,186 2.3
1990 2,448,000 9.0 40,443 9.6 1,175,000 4.7 12,523 3.0
1991 2i371,000 9.4 39,161 9.2 1,189,000 4.7 13,552 3.2
1992 2,362,000 9.3 40,053 9.4 1,215,000 4.8 16,795 3.9
1993 2,334,000 9.0 39,364 9.2 1,187,000 4.6 15,031 3.5
1994 2,362,000 9.1 40,405 9.4 1,191,000 4.6 16,308 3.8
1995 N/A N/A 40,516 9.3 N/A N/A 15,097 3.5
N/A - Not available.
1 Rate per 1,000 population.
2 Figures are rounded to the nearest thousand.
Questions about the sebject matter should be directed to the offices
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Table 1. Chvo e. and annuhlments endt rate: United Stes, 194040
j~~~~~~~el. ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ J~ rlf:om oalgutnVaIldOe.Aab ed a~~ ih19. andIrL. begi~ wkh 1560. Rates we 1,000 populelln
Raiw per 1.000-
ad TOW woesn 15&tia~ndilWS -Bai ym= andor
S...I.............................182000 4.7 20.91.0. ................................. 15,17.000 4.7 204
IN ........................................ . 1.17.000 4.8 20.7
197 ............................................ .11600 4.8 20.8
los .... . .......................... .. 1.178,000 4.9 212
1 ,S ................................................ 1.190.000 5.0 21.7
1964 ................................................... 1.16900 8. 21.5
lop .... ................................... 1,158.000 5.0 21.3
1962 .... .................................. ...... 1.170.000 5.1 21.7
196l .................................................. 1,213.000 5.3 22.6
1960 ............................................... 1,18g.000 8.2 22.6
979 .............................................. 1.0 5.3 22.
1976 ................................................. 1,130,000 5.1 21.9
177 ............................................ 1.081.000 5.0 21.1
17s...........................................183.0O00 8.0 21.1
17 ............................................ ...... . 138,o 4.8 20.3
1974 ................................................ 97700 4.6 19.3
1973 ................................................. 91500 4.3 18.2
12 ................................................ e4.0Ao 40 17.0
1971 ................................................ 773.000 3.7 15.8
1970 ................................................... 7800 3.5 14.
1969 ... .................................. .... 639.000 32 13.4
1ue ........................................ 84O0 29 12.5
1907 ................................................... . .300 U 11.2
Ie .......................................... ..... 499,00 2.5 10.9
lees .......................................... 479.00O U 10.9
1954 .......................................... 450 00 2.4 10.0
1963 .......................................... 428000 2.3 9.
1962 ................................................ 413.000 2.2 VA
191 ................................................ 41400 2.3 e.g
lw ... . .. .............................. . ...... 393.000 2.2 92
uI . .......................................... 35.000 2.2 g.3lose ... ........................................ 39A L. a
1967 .............................................. 381 .aW 22 9.2
lImS ... I....................................... 36 .000 2.3 O,4I ........................................ . 3 00 2.3 a
1264 ................................................ 370,000 2.4 9.5
1,s............................................. ...... . 390.00 9.09
1952 ............................................ .. .... . 382.00 28 10.1
1961 ............................................... 381.000 2.A 9-9
10 ............................................ .... .365.W0 2.0 10.3
1949 ........................................... . WW700 2.7 10.8
1948 ................................................. 40BA00 U 11.2
1947 .................................................. 483000 3A 12,8
1940 ................................................ 610.000 4.3 17.0
1948 ................................................ 4..0AW 8,5 14A
944 ................................................ 400.000 12.0
1943 ............................................. ....... 3.Aa 2 11.0
1942 ............................................ ...... . 3100 2A 10.1
1941 .......................................... 293UM 22 9.4140 ................................................... 241 - 2.0
SAWN ft1101-10e I , OW e kM pW EXB* T2dkadS
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Table 2. Numbe and rate of divorcee and annulments: United States, each region, division, and State. 1980,1989, and 1990
em arcours of doemaesgnanted mupplied bSlates. : wSi =oVZ dvl-glble States difer from fhos based an amle data shown In table 4. Rates pm
meufn nec a amed as ofAU r 8 aestmedaofM I for all came yeah)
Nuamer Rate
Rqs dWn and 190 1SU N980 ,930 f199 I50
sed Stae....................... 11.182,000 11.157000 1.189.000 4.7 4.7 52
Northes ..................... 1.000 171.000 174.000 3.3 3.4 3.5
mwst..................... ...... 4.000 212.000 20 4. 4.4 5.0
Soth ....................... 14700 1457.000 440.000 15.5 iS.4 6.0
We........................ ... .000 267.000 274.000 5.1 5.1 6.3
Nmthes*
New blgalrid................... 44030 45,715 49048 3.3 33 4.0
MbllAIlOI....................... 125,367 125.002 124,680 3.3 3.3 34
ead NoAh Ol ............... 197.347 R187.709 212.405 14.7 14.5 5.1
Wedt North Cent ................ 78256 74,778 78,125 4. 4  4.2 4.A
Sootf
South Alantl .................. 22.. A9 218.540 206344 5.2 5.1 5.8
East South Cntral ............... 1.506 90265 67528 60 60 '6.0
Wt South central .............. .14.007 2143.093 2155.025 2.5
Weal:
Mountain .......................... ".425 '76.52 88.088 S.s 26.3 7.6
Pacdl ......................... 179.584 2182,035 187.900 4.5 14.7 5.9
New England:
Mai.s....................... 5. 176 5.702 6,205 4.2 4.7 6.5
Now Ha pshi ...................... 4833 5,011 5254 4. 4.5 5.7
Vermont ............................. 2.491 2.823 2.623 4.4 4.5 5.1
aMssaalt a.................. =1625 16,819 17.573 2.7 2.5 31
RoeIsland ................... 3.754 3.625 3.606 3.7 3.6 3.8
Cminel; t.................... .11427 12.034 13.488 3.8 3.7 4.3
Middle anft,
New York ..................... . 8283 60.70 01.072 32 3A 35
Now Jerey .................... 27,113 28.0S8 27,706 3.5 3.4 3.8
3srinaSylar ................... 98.971 35473 34,22 3.4 3.2 2,A
Eat North Cenrds
0 * ........................ am,4 48.627 58.A0 4.9 4.5 s.4
Indaas......................... 23.571 13S.010 340J00 27.1 '6.3 3.
Slob....................... ... 45.977' 48.066 so897 4.0 40 4.5
mioft In..................... 40,565 40.276 45047 4.4 4.4 4.8
Wiscor ..................... 17.72Y 17,1130 17A$46 3.5 3.7 3.7
West North Control
Mbwiota .................... . 15.590 IS75 415.71 3. 3.0 43
lws ........................ . 10.8 10.507 11.554 3.8 3.A  4.1
Uineudi ............................ 25701 25.139 27885 5.0 4.9 5.6
Noth Dakota ................... 2.320 2229 2.142 3.0 3.5 3.3
So th Dakota .................. . . 2S1 2,624 2.811 3.8 3A 4.1
Nebmaim ...................... 6466 605 6.442 4.1 4.0 4.1
Kamsae ....................... 12.5.0 12.296 13.410 5.1 5.0 5.7
South Adntim
Delaware .......................... .286 2886 2.313 4.5 4A 3.8
Mayn ..................... ..... 18607 16.321 17.484 3.5 3.5 4.1
Otl of Cobanb ............... 2261 2,751 4.862 .S 44 7.3
Vin ............................. U.307 2. 23.815 4A 4.2 4A
Wes Vlrg nla................... . 775 9.154 10273 5.4 5.1 5.3
NoM Caam .................. 4,03 32.272 28.050 5.1 4.9 48
South Camlina .................. .16.18 IS11 1358 .6 4.4 4.4
GesrIw ...................... . 36.87 34,556 34,743 5.7 .4 6.4
lrmtda .......................... 10.95 7).868 71.579 8.2 63 7.3
Eas South Centare
Kentuky ......................... 20,A7 20.386 216.731 5.7 5.6 4.8
Tenesee ..................... 32.189 31A39 0206 6. 8.6 C.
abma. ...................... 25878 24.65 26,745 63 82 89
Mlesppld ..................... 12.735 12845 13.846 4.9 5.0 S.
Wet South Centrat
Arlum ..................... .. .1658 16.867 16.882 7.1 7.1 '6.9
Loulekals ....................... Ri= 2.922 *18.105 I4.3
Olahoma ......................... 24.877 23.050 24.228 7.9 7.3 8.0
Tag ............................ 93.85 93,434 98.809 5.5 5.0 605
Se foonotee at and of table.
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Table, 2. Number and rote of divorces and annulments: United States, each region, division, sad State, 1980, 1969, and 1990--Con.
a r outs of decres grnled supplied by Stales FIa es 1 l tration Slat diffs & those based an samle dats shown In table 4. Ra per
population In each area enumnerled u of Apl I tar 1o60 a d e o 8July i for as ow yos
MNante Rat
Ragbi. d and Stf IM 1oo 196 loo too 1980
11 ltna ..................... 4,049 4,112 4.940 5.1 5.1 6.3
da* ........................... 6.448 62 '75 6AN GA 6.3 7.0
Wyfnt ..................... .132 3,034 4003 6.6 6.6 a.3
Caoado ......................... 18,665 1Was 18.571 5.8 5.7 GA
Newl Mefoo ................... .... .. 327 '6,817 10.426 06.1 '5.g 8.0
Aeaons ...................... 25A,6 23.153 1908 6. GA 7.3
Utat ........................ . . 0.. so .119 7.902 5.2 4.8 5.3
Nna da .......................... 13A9 13203 13,642 10. 11.6 17.3
Wauniltan .................... 28.767 26.9 26.542 5.9 5.7 6.
Ougon .......................... 15.734 15079 17.762 8.5 5.4 6.7
Caomlan ..................... 127.044 UA31.02 5  133.541 4.3 U 4 .5 5.8
Aistik ............................ 3,170 3.426 3.517 6.7 6.3 8.8
Hoa ............................ 5,179 5,613 4,438 4.6 5.1 4.6
110190 kkel edplas; senohdod notes,
Wwe Nebmm " ow.nwe
4 .00 ap upelefS
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Table . Estmated number of children Involved In divorcee and annulments, average number ot Children per decree, and rate per 1,000
children under 1 yearn of age: United Stade, 1060o0
~ar 10es dilldren under 18I yasm ofage and 0nl to ovum acarning wtli Ole United Slates. SOOM139 igl M16. ealaed fmm frequences based an anWhfae r193049. eslajiled bern Mutotalis. For eusbninfg mesdad. as Teclviml note. P00ubSoEI enxaWetd asof ApS lI fr 1660.160. 1970. and 1og0 andslhieed - ot 4*1 Itfr eliG yowvasl
ESSAdao Awing. "OWp.
duanb mabw u,000 to
Yam hH~ Par dw~nw 
-~u Cf
1990. ......................................... 1.078.000 0.90 16.8
18 ........................................... 1.063,000 0.91 16.8
198 .......................................... 1.044000 9.81 16.4
lo7 .......................................... 
. 1,038.00 0.89 18.3
1666 .......................................... 
.1.064.000 0.90 16.8
1055 .. 01,000 0.82 17.31964 ..... ................. .................. 1081.,000 0.92 172
163 ................................. 
........ . 1091.000 0.4 17.4
1062 .......................................... 1.108,000 0.94 17.6
1661........... ........... ........... .......... 1,180.000 0.97 16.7
1680 .......................................... 1,174.000 0.96 17.
1979 .......................................... 1,181,000 1.00 16,4
1076 .......................................... 1,147,000 1.01 17.7
I977 .......................................... 
.. .10 .00 1.00 16.7
1978 .......................................... 1.117.000 1.03 16.1978 .......................................... 1.123,000 1.06 16.7
1974 ........................................ 
.. 1.000 1.12 16.21973 .......................................... 1.079.000 1.17 15.7
1972 .......................................... 
. 1 1.000 1.20 14.7
1971 . ......................................... 946,000 1.2 13.61970 .......................................... 70.000 1.22 12.5
169 ......................................... 64.000 1.31 11.9
I966 .......................................... 7841000 1.34 11.1
167 .......................................... 701.000 1.34 9.916 ......................................... 
. w. O00 1.34 .S188 .......................................... 
. . 830.0 1.32 8.9
1964 ......................................... 613.000 1.38 .7
963. .......................................... 562.000 1.1 6.2
10 2. .............. .......... ........... ........ =000 1.23 7.9191. ................ ......................... 516000 1.25 7.8
1960 .......................................... 463000 1.18 7.219 .......................................... 468.000 1.16 7.5
1856 .......................................... 395.000 1.08 6.S1957 ......................................... 379,000 0.99 SA
1956........................................... 361.000 0.95 6.3195 ........................................... 347,000 0.92 8.1954 .......................................... 341.000 0.90 6.4
1963 ........................................... 330.000 0.8S 6.4
1952 ........................................... 315.000 0.81 6Z.1951 ........................................... 304.000 0.80 6.1
1 0 ............................. 
............ 2 9.000 0.76 6.3
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47.0 2.I 20.0 L1
48,9 05.3 17.8 52
s0. 2 19.1 8.5
50.5 21 192 62
47. 5.2 191 6.7
622 22. 111 26.7
47.8 206 19.5 4.8
47.7 23 202 GA
452 2.7 20A 74
45 24.7 201 7.1
41.1 242 23.7 6
44. 23. 21 7.
492 282 195 le0
23.9 3 158 4.1
452 2. A 8
487 21.8 6.7
45 251 200 6.2
44.7 22. 1 8 7.7
364 24.7 25.1 10.1
40,6 2. 2.4 72
58 243 17.1 4.0
4.4 25.1 20. 6.4
48.2 R 20.4 6
432 27. 21.3 6.4
42.7 27.7 30 62
467 27.6 16.1 5.2
402 242 526 6.3
50.1 37.1 17.8 4.6
3Me 21A 21A 11.6
42A z. 25 6A
51.3 28.1 17.0 4.2
3A 24.8 2520 67
432 3.1 228 62
4or
AxJ
1002 46.8 202 19.9 62 1.1
I002 462 26.7 &8A 62 1.5
100.0 47. 24. 10-2 62 2.5
100.0 50. 23 16.7 5. 12
100 47.0 2. 1e6 5.7 1.3
1002 68A 32J 11.1 2.7
1000 46 Z0I.1 17.7 8 A
100. 44A 00. 2010 GA 2.
10O2 44
  
22. 21.8 7.4 U
1000 45A 282 204 70 2.1
1O00 00.1 24A 25 .0 2 3
I00 441 231 22.4 73 2.4
1000 002 26.6 16.6 41 1s
100 32 25. 162 4.0 O.
100 43,5 20 21.1 8.6 U
100 44.1 24. 214 73 52
1000 486 24. 19.7 6. 1.7
100 44 3.4 25 7.7 2S
100 37.1 28 24.7 OR 3.1
100 423 26.4 32 6.6 1.8
IO 6 522 .7 2L 1. 5.8 1.7
100.0 4.4 28. 21.0 u 1a
100 47.6 21.7 21.8 .7 2.5
1000 42.7 25A 222 6. I0
1002 40.5 20.1 24. U U
1000 4 28.4 I6 4.0 1.1
1002 411 24. 3.1 u 2.8
100.0 5061 m0. 17.8 41 1.1
1002 57, 224 21.0 1U 83
1002 39A 2 26.0 68 .1
1002 07 26.7 1720 48 1.0
I00.0 372 2. 286 5.7 2
100 42. 24 7.8
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14 Monthly Vital Statleistr Report a VoL 43, No. 9(6) 9 March 22,199,5Table S. Number ot divorcee and annulments by age of men and women at time of decae, 1990. and rates by age of men and women attime of dus'e 1970, 1980, and 1984-0: Divorce-registratlon area
JBaadan aampta data. Balm0t O UM m o fttna r aa. Ogur lot a&P nol atatad Wale dieltad Batr 196. rana seclude data lt Ml~a.ai. n aaj aoaMi19 raa aiduda diaa 1. ON and Sfuih Daota. Rd"a per tAW0 mntad popilation In apadWa grop alead -%2r kt Adi to,197 nd15as of J€ y e Ioal te yearnt
Ag4 a/mal &W. Macb' Ra
swnw &IAm ofu 1990sIS 1W 1999 01 1W I 16 IS 1904 tw 190
Mel
Al a ............... 60111 10.2 16.7 Iea 10,6 10 19.4 19.2 19.8 14.215--1 yeau .......... 2.153 32.A 34.7 X7.5 37. 412 40.0 42.8 2. 15.120-24 yam ........... 41.952 502 51.1 59 52.2 49.5 49.9 482 46.9 33.523-29 yaas............100607 39. 37. 38.9 37.6 32 384 37. 41.4 30.030-34 yean ........... ... 1112 31.9 30.5 302 30. 30.6 30.4 31.7 33.9 2L333-3 Years ........... 94.401 25. 25. 25. 28.0 2.4 26.3 27.1 26.9 17.940-44 year ........... .735 21.9 21.7 21.3 21.4 22.2 23.2 22.0 21.0 13.845-40 yam ........... 47505 17.3 15.9 17.0 17.1 17.R 16.7 18.1 14.5 10.750-4 yeaas ........... .. 273 12.0 11.5 11.4 Ila 10. 11.1 10.7 9.5 7.6W-69 ya ........... .1s.0 7.8 7.2 7.0 L5 5.4 6.6 G.4 5.8 5.160-64 yam ........... 9.623 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.465 yea and or ....... 9.599 2.1 2.0 1. 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9Not atat ............ 43. 3 4 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Ml ages ............. .50.111 15.7 15.4 18. 18.6 15.8 19.2 16.6 19. 14.0IS-10 yean .......... 8.316 486 52.0 55.3 49.5 51.4 46.4 43. 42.4 5.920-24 yam ........... .. 6340 480 44.8 46.3 46.0 48.2 46a 4A 47.2 33.325-20 yeaa ........... .11648 30. 36. 35. 33. 34.8 335. 35.0 37. 25.730-34 yea ........... 111,421 27.9 27.7 29.7 27.2 27.7 28.6 29.1 292 18.035-39 yearn ........... M.6,m 23.1 22.6 23 23.1 23.0 23.4 23.5 23.3 14.40,44 yarm ........... 6,310 19.3 19.1 19.0 18.7 156, 10.8 10. 16.7 11.945-4 ya ........... 36%852 13.6 12.9 13.0 13.1 12.6 12 11.8 10.50-64 yean ........... 1.330 6.2 7. 7.6 7.5 7. 7.4 7A 0.6 5.555-69 yea ........... .28 5 4. 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.2 43 0.9 3.60-64 yea ........... 5. 70 2.9 2.7 2. 22.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 yaam and ov ....... 5.151 IA 1.4 1. .5 1.5 1.6 IA IA 1.3Nt Is .d............ 46.692 ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ...
t kctdgadtrmac d tm p w s ISya. aga.
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Table 1. Percent distdrution at divorces and annulments by age of husband and wife at tdime of decre: DivarcaM-sgletraton area, 1970
and 1910-0
Oasd (n esanvi dale
A04o hu~id and
Id &I# of M W 1 IM IM8a 17 19O lw S IM I= 1 02 Mr 1Xa0 Yom
Hu~bWPWOmn -but
AD 8e..................... 1001 1A00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Under 0) yuM ................ A OA OA 0.4 0A 0. 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.0
20-24 ylmz ................ 7.8 82 .7 0.0 0.7 10 10.0 11.0 11.7 12.5 13.5 16.3
25-- tem ................ IU 180 19.5 20.2 20.0 21.0 20. 21.3 22. 22.8 23.4 22.8
30-347y.m ................ 20.7 212 20.8 20.8 20.0 200 20.7 21.0 21. 22.1 21A 162
-3I9ma ................ 17.0 17.5 17.2 17.3 170 17.2 17.1 16.e 16.3 10.1 14. 12
40.44 yam ................ 14.1 13.7 13.3 13.0 ILI 120 11.8 11.5 10.7 10.0 0.8 10.7
45-40ymm ................ 8.0 8.0 MA 8.1 7.8 7A 7A 7.2 00 8.7 68.5 8
so0-4 ps ................ 5.1 8.0 40 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.8 4. 4. 4.4 5A
55-a vars ................ 3.0 3.0 2A 2. . .0 U .0 2.9 2 2.7 2.7 3.2
60-04yam................... 1.8 10 10 18 1.7 1.0 1.7 1.7 1,5 1.8 IA 1.
65yeslnandow V............ 1.8 1 0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 10 1. 1.8 1A IA 1.7
WKSe
AN & ................... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Uner 2) yars .............. .1. 10 1.7 1.7 21 2.1 2 2.5 2.7 2.9 .4 4.1
20-24 ymm ................. 13.0 13.3 14.4 15.0 10.3 15a 17. 174 1.6 101 20.8 24.0
25- an ................. .210 22.4 22.0 22 22. 23.1 23.1 23.0 24.1 24. 24.0 21.
3"4 m ................ 20.0 21.1 20.4 20.3 19.4 18.0 10.7 10.5 19.9 202 1SA 14.4
5-35 y~....................18.3 102 15.8 10.1 102 15. 4 ISA 15.0 14.2 13.1 12.8 11.0
40-44 ylmI ................ 12.4 11.0 1A 11.0 10.1 10.2 9.8 $. 8.8 8.2 7.7 V.4
45-40yeam ................. 0 6.0 0.5 8.2 S8 5.0 .3 5.5 8.1 4.0 4.0 A .0
O4year ................ .. 4 3.a 32 32 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.8
85-40 yam ................ 1.7 Is 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.0
s0-04 yeas ................ 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.9 1.0
1yesniandover ............ 1. 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0. 08 0.8 0. 0
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Table 7. Median and mean age ot husband and wite at tim of dece by number of this marriage: Olvorcsaregiaration area, 1970-go
Bed n ,-rob d&a. Mea and men -npuled ndabe by al s d ap)
NMmiwdanbg Whwhmwd MNwnoaarge o/ '*
R 7nhn ofp Rwups of n
$ht Spffd anleg 02nlae &ctSWAd Rmand mwrhgeraw lh man*ga t The ri' Oanfe crm nal raw nrnnbg rolbt amMY" am" notawwr
l90 ............. 354 33.2 41.8 40.4
99 ............. 3.4 32 41.2 402
18s .............. 35.1 32.7 40.8 39.7
1987 ............. 342 32.8 40.4 39.5
1N8 ............. 34.8 32.4 40.0 302
198 ............. 34.4 32.2 39.8 38
1954 ............. 34.3 32.2 396 38.5
1983 ............. 34.0 21 39.3 3.83
1982 ............. 33.8 31.7 38.1 38.0
1 .............. 33.1 31.4 38.5 37.4
190 ............. 32.7 81.0 3. 37.3
1970 ............. 32.5 30.8 38.4 37.3
1971 .............. 32.0 30 36.2 302
197 ............. 32. 30.5 39.3 38.0
198O ............. 32.3 302 39.8 302
1975 ............. 322 30.1 392 3.8
174 ............. .32.2 302 40.3 38.7
1973 ............. 32A 30.4 40.8 393
1972 ............. 32.8 30.4 40.9 39.4
1971 ............. 32 30.5 41.5 40.0
1970 ............. 32.9 30.5 41. 39.9
199 ............. 37.5 350 4&1 41.
1985 ............... 72 34.8 42.9 41.
1988 ............. 36.g 34.7 42.8 41.8
1987 ............. 38.8 34.8 42.3 41.3
1986 . 3... 8 34.4 42.1 41.0
195 .3.............384 34.3 412 41.0
1984 ... .. 32 342 41.8 40.7
193 ............. 3.1 34.1 41.4 40.8
112 ............. 357 33.7 41.3 40.3
1961 ............ 35.4 334 402 39.8
I9O ............. 35.1 33.2 40.8 39.8
179 ............. 35.0 33.1 40.7 39.7
1978 ............ 342 32. 40.8 392
1977 .............. 51 3,3.0 41.4 40.4
107 .............. 3 1 32 41.7 40.4
1976 ............. 352A 32.8 41.7 40.4
1974 ............. 35.1 32.9 421 40.
1973 ............. 835. 33.1 42.4 41.1
1972 ............. 35 4 33.2 42.4 41.1
1971 .............. 35.8 332 427 41.4
1970 ............. 35 33.2 42 41.4
Median age In yearn
38.1 33.2 31.1 382
35A 32.9 30. 37.7
38.3 3.8 30.8 37.
35.1 32.5 30.U 37.3
34.9 32.1 302 37.0
34.5 312 30.0 35.8
34.4 31.7 30.0 38.4
34.1 31.5 29A. 38.3
33.7 31.1 29.5 35
33.4 30.8 20.1 35.3
US 30 28.8 32
85 30.1 28.8 35.3
32.8 29.7 23.3 35.1
325 29.9 282 3.7
31.9 29.7 28.1 302
32.8 29.5 27. 35.4
32. 29.5 27.7 38.7
31.7 29.7 27.8 37.
32 29.8 27.9 37.7
32.8 29.8 27.7 37.0
33.1 29*. 27.7 382
Meag age In yearn
572 34.8 32.9 39.8
374 34.8 32.7 392
37.0 34.4 32.5 39.0
37.2 34.2 32.4 38.8
36.6 US 322 38
38.4 33.7 32.0 38.8
30.4 33.8 31.9 38.2
30.1 33. 31.8 38.1
35.8 33.1 31.4 372
35.8 32.7 31.1 37.8
35.3 32.4 30.8 37.4
35A 32.3 0.7 37.4
35.0 32.1 . 37.2
35.1 32.4 3 38.1
34.8 32.3 30.4 3s
35.8 32.3 30.3 38.5
35.1 32.3 30. 38,8
342 32.5 30.4 39.1
35.3 32.8 30.5 38.3
352 32.7 30.4 39.4
35.4 32.7 30.4 39.
1
hjrmn mani,8 eMdM n mOC.
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Table a. Percant dlatrlbuion of diorce and annulments by ago of husband and wife at time of this marriage: lvo -rc~oglauration ams,
1970 OKId 380."0
jFrao alluape daoe)
Husband Port" d utian
N ............... 1000 100.0 100 0 03 1000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Unde' 211 yeai ............ V11.7 2.1 12.4 12A 13.7 14.2 14.9 1S.4 16.1 17.0 18.0 19.3
20-44 yu .............. 38A 39.3 422 40.5 40.8 41.4 41.9 42. 43.0 44.0 44.0 438
-yonm .............. 22.3 22.0 21.P 21. 21.0 2095 20.1 10.7 19.3 18.7 18A 10A
0-44 yluan.............. 11.a 11.1 IC.8 1.8 10.4 10,3 9.7 9.3 9.0 6.6 8.1 7.6
"enua ............... 04 &Z Ue6 8 5 9.4 5.1 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.6
40-44 yuaM .............. .&9 3. ai
7  3. 3.8 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.2
45 yea and ove .......... 5.2 5. E 0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.7 4.5 42 5.2
Wie
ANl gW ................ 100.0 00.0 101.0 1009 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1000
Und rM yam ............ 27. 28.5 z0 30.4 31.7 32.8 34.0 35.1 36.8 38 39.9 46.1
20r44yam .............. .35 36.3 30 3U 36.A 38.7 364 3 382 35.9 35.5 30.3
"y u .............. 1 A 1n Iva9 15.4 14. 14.4 13. 13.3 12.7 12.1 1.4 9.5
304 pu 4u .............. U U. .1 7.9 7.6 72 0.8 6.7 8.2 5.8 86 4.8
35-W39 yu.............. 5.1 4.6 4, 4.5 44 4.0 4.0 .7 2 3.2 3.1 3.4
40-44y ma .............. .2.7 2.7 .5 2.4 2.3 23 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.3
45 yeam ad or.......... 3.0 2. .9 .0 2. 2 29 2.9 2 2.7 2A U.5
EXHIBIT 9
612 LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 62
18 Monthly Vital Statlstic Report a VOL 43, No. 9(8) a March 22, 1995
Table 9. Median and mean age at husband and wifet tinm of this marriage by number at marriage: Dlvorce-mrglatration area, 1970-0
lasid an ame data. MOON a meems mwtd en M by a gbm en P d sel
Atar~dauab ddaaea Anbaraamog a/ads
.id Areebwd ThmdrMenb Oef
Sewnd Mw~se mav e Smdw ffdage -gomsWa, 7wn mwa Trw, aitun Grew# na oi d rw atanto 1bt ao mW, namwed
.......... 43 23.1
190 ............. 243 231965 ............. ... :8 2.
197 ............. 24. 22.8
199 ............. 24.3 22.7
15 .............. 24. 22
I04 ............. 24.0 22.
1ON ............. . 2 7 22
1981............... 237 22.3
Iwo ............... 23 221A
IM'u0............. 23.8 22A
1979 ..... 232 21
978 ............. 12 213
197 .............. 23.1 21A
1978................2 31 213
1975............... 23.0 2131  ............. 3  .8
97o ............... 2 21.
1071............... 23 21.8
1970................ 23.0 21.8
199 ............. 27.8 24.2
1 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 
7 .8 2 4 .1
1M 2............. 27.3 33
187 ............. 27.2 29
198................ 2.0 23.4
l 98 ............. 2. 23.7
198 ................ 28.7 23.
19 3................2 8. 23.4
1982................20A 23.5
108 6............. 25.1 23.1
1980.........25.9 23.0
979 ............... 2 . 22.9
1976 ............. 25.7 223
197 .............. . 9 22.9
1978 ............... 253 22
ion ............. .OA 22
1074............... 253 22.6
971 ............... 2.0 22A
970 ............... 28.1 .0







































































































2002] KENNETH RIGBY 613
Monthly Vital StatistIcs Report a VoL 43, No. 9(S) a March 22, 1995 19
Tablo 10. Median and man duration of marriage at time at dean, by number of this marage at husband and wft: Dlvorce-rglatmIon
area, 1970-90
l~Uae. rn aa, p da]
M $od Aiep OW*Im*.W Mas'Wamw. OWA me*
Rof nw o-7 n M
77M Vm/ r Mtwal 77dV/ acw M41re
50 .................. 7.2 5.1 SA5 0.
Ing .................. 7.2 .1 5.7 62
Igoe .................. 7.1 .0 5.5 5.9
1987 ................... 7.0 7.9 5 5.7196.................... .U 7.9 .1 5,5
885 ................... 58 6.0 4. 5.4
14 .................. . U 52 4 
03 ................... 7.0 5.4 4 8 52
1982 .................. 7.0 0. 4. 5.0
161 0.................. 7.  1 .U 4.
1980 .................. U 7.6 4.4 4.5
1975 .................. U 7.5 4.4 4.8
176..................... U 7.6 4. 4.6
197 .................. U 7. 4. 4.5
t976..................... U 7.3 4. 4.0
1975 .................... L 7.3 4.5 4.5
1974 .................... U 7.3 46 50
153 .................... L 7.5 4.0 4.9
1r .................. .. 7 7.5 4.7 5.0
1971 .................. 6.7 746 4.9 5.2
1970 .................. .7 7.5 4. .1
lo0 ..................... 9.5 10.5 7.4 7.5
199 .................. . 89 10.9 72 78
198 .................... 9.7 10.5 7.0 7.5
1957 ................... 38 10.5 6. 7.4
96 4 ................. 5 8 10.7 0.7 72
195 .................. .5 10.7 6.7 72
194 .................... 9.5 10.5 6.5 7.0
193 .................. .CA 10.5 56 7.0
I19 .................... CA 10. , 4 .5
1951 .................... U 10.4 5.5 .7
1950.................... 2 102 02 U
197 ..................... 9.3 105 8 6.7
1978 .................. .1 10.1 8. .7
1977 .................... 92 102 1.5 5.8
1970..................... 92 10.1 6.5 7.8
1976..................... 92 10.0 6.7 7.1
1974..................... 9 10.1 5.8 72
197 .................... 9A 10.3 LI 72
I9 . .................... .5 10.3 7.1 U
1971 ................... .95 10U 4 7.1 7A
1970 .................. 5S 10.4 7.1 7A
ln. ..aeuod, nm8w na dm
MeO dumabin 9n yuma
5.8 6. 5.5 6.1
72 82 5A .0
7.0 6.1 5.3 5.9
7.0 .0 5.1 5
.8 7.9 5.0 5.5
6.4 S 4.5 5.4
6. .2 4.7 62
.5 5.4 4.7 5.2
6.5 U 4.5 5.0
6.8 5O 4A 4.8
6.5 7.7 44 4
C.A 7.7 4.4 4.5
6.5 7.5 4.5 4.7
6.4 7.4 4.5 4.5
6.1 7.3 4.5 4.8
5.4 7.2 45 5.0
5G4 72 4A5 5,0
5.A 7.- 4.5 52
.2 7.4 4.5 U
6.3 7.5 4.8 5A
6.5 7.5 4.5 U
Mean duintm In yeu
9.3 11.0 7.1 7.7
0.7 10.9 7.0 7.5
V.A 10.5 6.8 7.5
9.5 10.8 6.5 7.3
9.4 10.7 8.7 7.2
02 10.7 U 7.1
5.1 108 5.5 7.0
8.1 10.5 5.5 7.5.5 10.5 5.5 5.85.1 10.4 6.3 .7
U 102 LI 5,5
0.1 10.2 LI U
U 10.1 5.5 0.7
0 10.1 5.5 7.0
5.3 10.1 5.6 7.0
5.1 10.0 6.5 7.3
5. 10.1 6.5 72
2 10. 7.0 7A5
.2 10. 7.1 7A6
.4 10.4 72 7.7
.4 10.4 7.1 7.7
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Chart 4-Gwds or Diwrce aad Read&ency Requiremet
STT Sol. Omw to Tbaiid In lmpotf md AW. JudWW Sq~aili R1anmmso
Aimx x x " os"
x X_ X mapAlsm-x as mAllS x WdM
CAVINSI x X 6 Moo"e
Wa. I i. X I You
D.C. X Iyor X 6M
Xm1 ____ 6 mainrwids X mu
Hasafl X 1 x 4M
dM x X 6 womb
Dumb X 2yan x go d~rs
xid. x I___ S dya
I...y x 60 1pxto "taakhm X, X .rb-d 6MOI
MXni.. X
_____X_ _______
UCibma X Se X Il0da




MiLad X yew I, ye
mbmMaw x 6J0 dm x IS dlo$d
mhomw x 6 Mse
uboix 1.2 yom x wodr
x x . SII aw
Mmd. X i X Mon IYa
ma. Ha4M_ a - x ____ x 6 Ip •
Mawai Shl X X 6moeh
New York AX Ia r X I your
Has DaMI 
_ X 6Moe
Ohio X X I _ __ 6uIsd
Ger 2 ya 6 momm
Ibods Ishd X I yamJ x I Yaw
WA lI x 17 X 3muffi
SoA Dekm X x Noss
Tammn X 3 yam X 6 Me
Tw~nM X 3)m 6osMe
• Uw"  x 3 )*an x :::





1. COMMS uda8. SUS aWAMlg qslflC - hrdI f arAVOMS f r dwaaL. Two pm. 1br Co.."pa
3. -Ag ~a PMu"* khndad
4. 11.0oucidi Sis-..
6 SROeMI
6 moue
" das
EXHIBIT 12
